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Executive Summary 
  
Across the country, state health department officials are considering the capabilities of 
their departments to respond to a biological or chemical terrorism incident.  
Traditionally, the responsibilities of the state health departments have been disease 
surveillance and management.  Health departments now are defining their roles to 
respond effectively to an intentional release of biological organisms or hazardous 
chemicals into an unsuspecting population.   
 
In federal fiscal year 1999, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
received congressionally-appropriated funds to enter into multi-year cooperative 
agreements aimed at upgrading state and local health department preparedness and 
response capabilities relative to bioterrorism.  A portion of these funds was used to 
facilitate preparedness and readiness assessments.  Grantees receiving the Focus 
Area A Funds must develop terrorism response plans.  In return, CDC committed to 
developing planning guidance.  The Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical 
Terrorism:  Interim Planning Guidance for State Public Health Officials fulfills that 
commitment. 
 
This Planning Guidance is designed to help state public health officials determine the 
roles of their departments in response to biological and chemical terrorism and to 
understand the emergency response roles of local health departments and the 
emergency management system.  The Planning Guidance also can be used to help 
state health departments coordinate their efforts with the many agencies and 
organizations at all levels of government that ultimately would respond to a biological or 
chemical terrorism event.   
 
Response efforts differ according to each state=s size, population, risks, needs, and 
capabilities.  Rather than establishing a Aone size fits all@ model, this document 
provides general guidance that can be tailored to meet the needs of individual 
jurisdictions.  
 
Objectives of the Planning Guidance 
 
Many state and local health departments lack plans for responding to terrorism events.  
Moreover, public health activities may not be well integrated with those of other state 
agencies that are responsible for responding to emergencies of all types. To remedy 
this, the Planning Guidance seeks to accomplish the following: 
 
• Help health departments integrate their terrorism response efforts into their  
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• states= overall emergency preparedness and response frameworks. 
 
$ Help states develop realistic terrorism response plans that are consistent with 
their resources, capabilities, and needs. 
  
$ Help states identify the capabilities necessary to meet the key elements of a 
public health preparedness program. 
 
$ Help health departments build communication links with other assets in the 
health-care community, e.g., hospitals, emergency departments, acute-care 
centers, and first response organizations, to assess local capacities and 
coordinate responses. 
 
$ Help states assist their local health departments in terrorism response 
planning efforts. 
 
$ Help states understand and access federal assets available during a 
biological or chemical terrorism release. 
 
 
Organization 
 
The Planning Guidance has three distinct, yet interrelated components:  chapters, 
annexes, and appendices.  These parts build upon each other, ensuring that the 
resulting terrorism plan integrates into the state=s existing Emergency Operations Plan 
(EOP) and effectively coordinates the roles and responsibilities of all response 
agencies.  
 
The five chapters of the Planning Guidance contain public health-specific programmatic 
guidance for terrorism response preparedness.  The emergency response activities 
outlined throughout these chapters should be consistent regardless of the agent that 
triggers the response.  Therefore, the core chapters cover preparedness and response 
activities without designating the agent.  
 
Chapter 1 presents the objectives, organization, and development of the Planning 
Guidance.  It also presents Ten Essential Services for Public Health, a list of capabilities 
developed by CDC in collaboration with the Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials and the National Association of County and City Health Officials.  Developing 
effective capabilities under each of these essential services will lay a dependable 
foundation upon which to build the key elements of the public health terrorism response 
system. 
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Chapter 2 outlines the five Key Preparedness Elements for Terrorism Response: 
Hazard Analysis, Emergency Response Planning, Health Surveillance and 
Epidemiologic Investigation, Laboratory Diagnosis and Characterization, and 
Consequence Management.  The first two elements are covered in Appendix I.  
Preparedness planning to satisfy the requirements of Elements 3 through 5 is covered 
in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively.   
 
Some response activities must be tailored to the unique characteristics of the agent 
involved.  Considerations for these agent-specific response activities are presented in 
the annexes.  Biological-specific information is provided in Annex A, and chemical-
specific information is contained in Annex B.   
 
Each annex briefly outlines the agents of concern for planning purposes and provides 
information on the medical management of casualties.  The annexes also provide 
agent-specific guidance for surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory analysis, and 
consequence management that builds upon the information contained in Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5.   
 
Appendix I focuses on the development of a basic EOP.  The EOP should form the 
foundation for the development of the terrorism response plan.  It is impossible to 
include a comprehensive discussion on planning in this document; however, Appendix I 
contains sufficient general guidance to serve both as an introduction for those unfamiliar 
with basic emergency management planning concepts and as a refresher for seasoned 
planners.   
 
Appendix II includes basic information regarding the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 
(NPS)Ba national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support 
medications, IV administration and airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical 
items.  NPS program staff established guidance for developing stockpile-related 
Standard Operating Procedures.  The sensitive nature of some of the information 
precluded its inclusion in this document; however, state and local public health planners 
may obtain a copy by contacting the NPS Program as follows: 
 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program 
4770 Buford Highway 
Mailstop F-23 
Atlanta, GA 30341-3724 
(770) 488-7516 
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CDC welcomes suggestions to make The Public Health Response to Biological and 
Chemical Terrorism:  Interim Planning Guidance for State Public Health Officials more 
useful to state and local agencies.  To provide comments about this document or to 
receive public health planning technical assistance, please contact the following: 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch 
4770 Buford Highway, Mailstop F-38 
Atlanta, GA 30341-3724 
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ACRONYMS 
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CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
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EMS Emergency Medical Services 
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Chapter 1 
OVERVIEW 
 
 
The Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Terrorism:  Interim Planning 
Guidance for State Public Health Officials (hereafter referred to as the Planning 
Guidance) outlines steps for strengthening the capacity of the public health system to 
respond to and protect the nation against the dangers of a terrorism incident.  Although 
the Planning Guidance focuses on the biological and chemical terrorism preparedness 
efforts of state-level health department personnel, it can be used as a planning tool by 
anyone in the response community, regardless of his or her position within that 
community or level of government.  The public health community at large also can use 
this document to improve its terrorism preparedness and develop terrorism response 
plans.a  The preparedness program outlined in this Planning Guidance, once 
implemented, should improve the ability of all public health agencies to respond to 
emergency situations arising from all sources, not just terrorism.   
 
The Planning Guidance focuses on the capabilities that state health departments are 
likely to need to respond effectively to a terrorism incident.  Despite the public health 
focus of this document, the terrorism plan ultimately should not be agency-specific.  
Instead, the terrorism plan should be integrated, outlining the roles and responsibilities 
of all agencies that participate in a response.  This coordinated terrorism plan should 
then be annexed to the state=s all-hazard Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).b 
 
 
Background 
 
The intentional release of sarin, an organophosphate nerve agent, into the Tokyo 
subway system helped to focus the United States on its need to prepare for what was  
once unthinkable.  Aum Shinrikyo, the group responsible for the Tokyo incident, 
disbursed botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria, and the group attempted to obtain 
Ebola (1). 
 
The World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings confirm that terrorism is not an 
event that occurs only on foreign soil.  Terrorism incidents or threats involving 
 
a Planners in health-care facilities can refer to ABioterrorism Readiness Plan B A Template for Healthcare 
Facilities@ prepared by the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC).  
This document is available on the APIC Web site at URL: www.apic.org. 
b The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommends that terrorism-specific response 
protocols be annexed to the state=s emergency plan.  These terrorism protocols are referred to as the 
Aterrorism plan@ throughout this document. 
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Salmonella (2) and ricin (3) amply demonstrate that the United States is vulnerable not 
only to bombs but to biological and chemical threats as well.c  
 
These and other events caused health departments across the country to consider their 
ability to respond to a terrorism incident.  In addition to their more traditional 
responsibilities in disease surveillance and management, health departments are 
defining their roles to respond effectively to an intentional release of biological 
organisms or hazardous chemicals into an unsuspecting population.   
 
Because states differ in size, population, risks, needs, and capabilities, terrorism 
preparedness and response efforts inevitably must differ.  This document does not 
establish a Aone-size-fits-all@ model; rather, it addresses important areas of 
preparedness and response that can be tailored to meet the needs of individual 
jurisdictions.  Health department officials should consider the information contained in 
this guidance, identify the health and medical effects that an explosion or the intentional 
release or threatened release of a biological organism or hazardous chemical could 
have on the population, and prepare to address the public health consequences of 
those effects.   
 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) welcomes suggestions to make 
this Planning Guidance more useful to state and local agencies.  To provide comments 
about this document or to receive public health planning technical assistance, please 
contact the following: 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch 
4770 Buford Highway, Mailstop F-38 
Atlanta, GA 30341 
 
The telephone number is also CDC=s 24-hour emergency number.   When an 
emergency call is received, a CDC emergency coordinator directs the caller to the 
appropriate subject-matter expert(s). 
 
c Whereas the Tokyo subway attack killed 12, the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City killed 168.  In addition, the August 7, 1998, U.S. Embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killed 224. Thus, many experts believe that the use of conventional 
weapons (i.e., explosives) remains a more credible threat than that posed by other forms of terrorism.  
However, possible ramifications of the use of biological or chemical weapons compel us to prepare for 
their potential use as well.   
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Objectives 
 
Many state and local health departments lack plans for responding to biological or 
chemical terrorism events.  Moreover, public health activities may not be well integrated 
with those of other state agencies that are responsible for responding to emergencies 
of all types.  On the basis of these observations, the objectives of this Panning 
Guidance are as follows: 
 
$ Highlight the pivotal role of the public health system in terrorism preparedness 
and response. 
 
$ Help health departments integrate their terrorism response efforts into their 
states= overall emergency preparedness and response frameworks. 
 
$ Help states develop realistic terrorism response plans that are consistent with 
their resources, capabilities, and needs. 
 
$ Help states identify the capabilities necessary to meet the key elements of a 
public health preparedness program. 
 
$ Help health departments build communication links with other assets in the 
health-care community (e.g., hospitals, emergency departments, and acute-
care centers) to assess local capacities and coordinate responses. 
 
$ Help states assist their local health departments in terrorism response 
planning efforts.  
 
$ Help states understand and access federal assets available during a 
biological or chemical terrorism release. 
 
 
Organization 
 
The Planning Guidance focuses on emergency planning as the cornerstone of terrorism 
preparedness.  For those not familiar with emergency planning, generic planning 
guidance is provided in Appendix I.  Each chapter in this document is devoted to the 
planning requirements of a particular preparedness program element.  This allows 
individual departments responsible for each of the key elements to focus on issues 
relevant to their planning efforts, while allowing the lead planner to review those efforts 
within the context of this document as a whole.  These Atear out@ chapters include a 
planning checklist and detailed planning guidance. 
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Much of the material covered in the checklists is specific in nature and more 
appropriately could support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).  The state should 
include these procedures in the appropriate document, either the plan or SOP, 
consistent with the level of detail contained in the state=s existing EOP.   
 
The checklists present questions that states should consider during the planning and 
preparedness process.  The questions are not exhaustive (i.e., states are not 
constrained from including other sections or provisions not covered in the checklists) 
nor must all items referenced be included in the plan. 
 
Filling out the checklists is not necessary.  Their intent is to prompt discussions and aid 
the planner in designing and organizing the public health terrorism response plan.   
 
A Ano@ response to a question should prompt health departments to consider whether 
the item is necessary to the state=s terrorism preparedness.  If it is a necessary 
component, actions should be taken to fill the identified need as rapidly as possible.  If 
the component is not necessary or can be filled at a later date, planning should continue 
without it. 
 
The core chapters of this Planning Guidance cover preparedness and response 
activities without delineating the agent because these activities should be consistent 
regardless of the agent that triggers the response.  In some instances, the response 
activities may vary depending on the involved agent.  For those instances, biological- 
and chemical-specific information is contained in Annexes A and B, respectively.   
 
The Planning Guidance addresses preparedness issues related specifically to biological 
and chemical terrorism.  This focus is necessitated by the unique challenges posed by 
these agents and the potential magnitude of the health and medical consequences that 
could result from their use.  The Planning Guidance does not specifically address  
conventional weapons or radiological weapons; however, many of the planning 
recommendations in this Planning Guidance can be applied to conventional and 
radiological situations.  States are advised to assess their trauma systems for their 
capacity to handle conventional mass casualties and to be reminded that an explosive 
may be used to disperse hazardous agents.  
 
 
Development 
 
Previously, CDC developed Ten Essential Services for Public Health in collaboration 
with the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) and the National 
Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO).  These Ten Essential 
Services for Public Health appear in Exhibit 1.  Many of the checklist questions relate  
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directly to the essential services.  Developing effective capabilities under each of these 
essential services will lay a dependable foundation upon which to build the key 
elements of the public health terrorism response system. 
 
In addition to the checklist questions, states should refer to Fiscal Year 1999 State 
Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program Assessment and Strategy Development 
Tool Kit, a document published by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice 
Programs (OJP). Task C of that document contains the APublic Health Performance 
Assessment Instrument for Emergency Preparedness@ developed by CDC and OJP in 
conjunction with ASTHO and NACCHO.d  The health assessment is a series of 
questions that relate the ten essential services to the terrorism setting. 
 
This Planning Guidance is based on the premise that each state will use the information 
obtained from the completed OJP health assessment to establish its baseline public 
health capability.  This capability assessment will then form the basis for terrorism 
emergency response planning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d The governor of each state designated a State Administrative Agency Director.  These designees 
received the Tool Kit.  A Web version of the instrument also is available for downloading at URL: 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps.  
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Exhibit 1:  Ten Essential Services for Public Health 
 
To respond effectively to terrorism, states should have the capacity to: 
  
1. Monitor health status to rapidly detect and identify an event due to hazardous biological, 
chemical, or radiological agents (e.g., community health profile before an event, vital 
statistics, and baseline health status of the community); 
2. Diagnose and investigate infectious disease and environmental health problems and 
health hazards in the community specific to detecting and identifying an emergency 
event due to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent (e.g., effective 
epidemiologic surveillance systems, laboratory support necessary for determining a 
biological, chemical, or radiological event in a time-sensitive manner); 
3. Inform, educate, and empower people about specific health issues pertaining to a threat 
or emergency event due to the release of a hazardous biological, chemical, or 
radiological agent (e.g., health communication effectiveness in implementing a rapid and 
effective response); 
4. Mobilize state and local partnerships to rapidly identify and solve health problems before, 
during, and after an event due to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent, 
including issues related to the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (e.g., demonstrate an 
effective knowledge of all key partners involved in effectively responding to an 
emergency event, including terrorism); 
5. Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health efforts in 
preparing for and responding to emergencies due to hazardous biological, chemical, or 
radiological agents (e.g., demonstration of practical, realistic, and effective emergency 
response plans);   
6. Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety in case of an 
emergency or threat due to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent (e.g., 
enforcement of sanitary codes to ensure safety of the environment during a terrorism 
event); 
7. Link people to needed personal health services in the course of a threat or event due to 
a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent (e.g., services that increase 
access to health care in a timely and effective manner); 
8. Assure a competent and trained public and personal health-care workforce for rapid 
response to a threat or event due to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological 
agent (e.g., education and training for all public health-care providers in effective 
response to an emergency event or threat); 
9. Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and population-based health 
services available to respond to a threat or event due to a hazardous biological, 
chemical, or radiological agent (e.g., continuous evaluation of public health programs 
which respond effectively to a public health emergency); and 
10. Participate in research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems 
resulting from exposure to a hazardous biological or chemical agent (e.g., links with 
academic institutions and capacity for epidemiologic and economic analyses of a 
chemical or bioterrorism event). 
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Chapter 2 
GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 
 
General Preparednesse 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  4.1; 5.1] 
 
The worst time to determine the appropriate actions in response to an emergency 
situation is during the emergency.  Thus, it is critical that health department officials 
clarify the preparedness roles and responsibilities of their departments and identify likely 
response activities before they are needed. 
 
Preparedness encompasses the various activities that can be taken before an 
emergency.  Such activities define and enhance the response system and range from 
expanding existing surveillance systems to developing and maintaining a viable EOP.  
 
Routine procedures, which health departments follow in day-to-day operations, are 
likely to exist already whether or not they have been formalized into SOPs.  On the 
other hand, EOPs establish roles, responsibilities, and protocols for responding to an 
emergency situation and are reserved for special or unique situations.  The EOP should 
not be written until the planners have a consistent understanding of what constitutes 
emergency circumstancesBthose times when routine procedures must be augmented 
by the emergency-unique procedures or protocols in the emergency plan. 
 
Key Elements of a Public Health Preparedness Program  
 
In the event of terrorism incident, in particular covert terrorist attacks, the public health 
community will have a special role in preventing illness and injury.  As with emerging 
infectious diseases, early detection of a terrorist attack and control of its consequences 
depend on a strong and flexible public health system at the local, state, and federal 
levels and on the vigilance of health-care workers throughout the nation who may be 
first to observe and report unusual illnesses or injuries.  
 
For public health department officials to effectively prepare their departments to respond 
to an actual or threatened terrorism event, the departments must be capable of the 
following:  
 
e References are made to the DOJ/CDC assessment tool throughout this document to link various 
aspects of this Planning Guidance with public health assessment indicators. 
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$ Identifying the types of events that might occur in their communities.  
 
$ Planning emergency activities in advance to ensure a coordinated response 
to the consequences of credible events. 
 
$ Building capabilities necessary to respond effectively to the consequences of 
those events.  
 
$ Identifying the type or nature of an event when it happens. 
 
$ Implementing the planned response quickly and efficiently. 
 
$ Recovering from the incident. 
 
To meet these capabilities, a health department should develop the following Key 
Preparedness Elements for Terrorism Response: 
 
 
Key Preparedness Elements 
 
1. Hazard Analysis 
2. Emergency Response Planning 
3. Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation 
4. Laboratory Diagnosis and Characterization 
5. Consequence Management 
 
 
Elements 1 are 2 are covered in Appendix I.  Elements 3, 4, and 5 encompass Chapters 
3, 4, and 5, respectively.   
 
To complement this Planning Guidance and to support state planning efforts, CDC 
maintains a public Web site on biological and chemical terrorism preparedness and 
response at URL: www.bt.cdc.gov.  This site provides specific disease/chemical 
information that state and local agencies need to ensure they are developing sound 
plans based upon the nature of the threat.  Information pertaining to current events, 
training, state and local contacts, medical management of patients, hospital  
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preparedness guidance, legal issues, and a variety of public relations/media reference 
materials also are available on this Web site. 
 
 
Managing the Incident Scene 
 
This section briefly explains the management structure used most often to direct on-
scene emergency response activities.  It is included to help health departments better 
coordinate their efforts with on-scene activities.   
 
An incident is managed through the actions of Command and Control.  Whether the 
incident is small or large, Command and Control Adirect and/or control resources by 
virtue of explicit legal, agency, or delegated authority.@f  The Command and Control 
structure most commonly used today in the United States is Incident Command 
System/Unified Command (ICS/UC).  Incident Command manages the scene, whereas 
Unified Command describes the integration of federal, state, and private resources into 
a single response under the principles of the Incident Command System.   
 
Portions of the at-large public health community, especially Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS), are familiar with and have played a role in the ICS.  However, that 
familiarity does not apply necessarily to health departments and hospitals.  State health 
department officials should gain a working knowledge of the ICS and UC for several 
reasons.  Increasingly, traditional first responders are asking health departments to 
provide on-scene technical assistance for terrorism threats.  Health department officials 
need to understand the roles and positions of their departments in the ICS structure to 
provide public health-related information through the appropriate functional group to the 
incident commander.  Whether on-scene or not, health department officials should 
understand the management structure through which their departments will most likely 
coordinate the management of public health issues and track patients.  
 
The ICS is built around the command function and four subordinate functions:  planning, 
operations, logistics, and finance and administration.  These functions are the 
foundation for the development of the ICS organization. The system is designed to 
expand from one person performing all tasks under the command function to several 
hundred people supporting each function.  All personnel and resources involved in the 
response effort are assigned to one of these five functions. 
 
f Adapted from FEMA=s Basic Incident Command Independent Study Course available at URL: 
www.fema.gov/emi/is195Ist.htm. 
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Numerous ICS guidance documents exist.g  Those not familiar with the system may 
refer to one of these documents or attend an ICS training course. 
 
g For more information, please refer to FEMA=s Basic Incident Command Independent Study Course, the 
U.S. Fire Administration/National Fire Academy=s Fire Command Operations course, 
(http://www.usfa.fema.gov/nfa/tr6e5.htm), and Emergency Response to Terrorism: Incident Management, 
(http://www/usfa.fema.gov/nfa/tr6m1.htm). 
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INVESTIGATION CONSIDERATIONS 
  
 
General Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Planning 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  1.1; 2.2; 2.3.7; 5.1.1.16; 6.2.1.11; 
10.1] 
 
Well-developed surveillance and epidemiologic capacity is the foundation on which 
health departments will detect, evaluate, and design effective responses to terrorism 
events.  Not only will this capacity facilitate the initial detection and response in a 
terrorism event, it will be essential to monitoring the impact of these events and the 
effectiveness of public health responses. Detection of acute or insidious terrorism 
attacks using biological (or certain chemical) agents also will require linking of data from 
a variety of sources.  An effective public health response will depend on the timeliness 
and quality of communications among numerous partnersCpublic health agencies at 
local, state, and federal levels; clinicians; laboratories; poison centers; medical 
examiners; and other health response partners. 
 
Complementing the need for accurate and timely case reports is the need for expertise 
to analyze the information properly.  Epidemiologic expertise is critical to judging 
whether the incident involves biological or chemical agents or is a consequence of a 
natural phenomenon, an accident, or terrorism.  Expertise also is critical in determining 
the likely site and time of the exposure; size and location of the population exposed; 
prospect for delayed exposure or secondary transmission of an infectious agent; and 
whether any people should receive prophylaxis (either medications or vaccines) and, if 
so, which population groups. 
 
Timely and accurate information and analysis must be coupled with effective and rapid 
dissemination of information to those who need to know (e.g., response partners and 
the public) to instill confidence in both the short- and long-term response of the affected 
community. 
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Planning Requirements 
 
Personnel and Training 
 
Effective epidemiologic and surveillance planning must begin with the designation of 
a bioterrorism coordinator who will lead or actively participate in the planning 
process for terrorism preparedness.  This coordinator also can serve as liaison to 
response partners in other public health and non-public health agencies. 
 
No matter how effective the designed system, it will falter unless a sufficient number 
of appropriate staff members are identified to conduct epidemiologic investigations in 
the event of a suspected or confirmed biological or chemical terrorism event.  
Adequate surge capacity is especially important to meet emergency needs.  
 
To maximize effectiveness, the state should train state and local public health staff in 
issues related to possible terrorism events, including health surveillance, community 
medical needs assessments, epidemiology, outbreak investigation, and worker 
biosafety issues.  This bioterrorism training should be coordinated with other federal, 
state, and local health programs to ensure integration of bioterrorism preparedness 
and response activities.  These may include the Health Alert Network, the 
Emergency Preparedness Information Exchange (Epi-X), the Emerging Infections 
Program, the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity program, Information Network 
for Public Health Officials, Assessment Initiative, Hazardous Substances Emergency 
Events Surveillance, influenza surveillance, and other emergency response 
programs, including local Metropolitan Medical Response Systems (MMRS). 
 
Legal Authority for Surveillance of Biological or Chemical Incidents 
 
Health departments generally possess the legal authority to receive reports and 
investigate unusual illness clusters.  To the extent your state=s disease reporting 
laws do not include a broad requirement to report unusual or exotic diseases or 
manifestations of illness, including such a requirement should speed recognition of 
an outbreak, whether naturally occurring or terrorism-related. 
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The reportable diseases list also should include cases of diseases suspected or 
confirmed to be caused by high priority bioterrorism agents.h  To underscore that 
these diseases are of special interest and require immediate reporting, publicize and 
highlight them on the reportable diseases list or list them separately from other 
notifiable diseases. 
 
 
Public Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Plan  
 
As with the overall planning process, development of enhanced surveillance and 
epidemiologic protocols requires collaboration among appropriate public health 
partners.  The partners include CDC and other federal response agencies, state and 
local public health agencies, hospitals, health-care providers, medical examiners, 
animal health providers, pharmaceutical suppliers, emergency management agencies, 
and law enforcement agencies. 
 
The plan should include algorithms for identifying which events should be investigated 
(including case definitions for those events) and how to investigate them (including 
methods and data sources for rapid case ascertainment under emergency conditions).  
The plan should identify whom to contact through the compilation and distribution of a 
directory of emergency resources and contacts (including state and local public health 
contacts, health-care providers, MMRS, law enforcement officials, etc.)  Finally, the plan 
should distinguish how and to whom to disseminate information for appropriate action. 
 
Enhanced Capacity for Emergency Communications 
  
If not already in place, provide a well-publicized 24-hour/day system to facilitate 
disease reporting to the local and state health departments, especially for reporting 
diseases related to potential terrorism events.  The system should include rapid 
notification of key people (e.g., state epidemiologist, state laboratory director, and 
state emergency management officials).  The state also should develop a broadcast 
fax network or other rapid means for disseminating emergency information.  This 
system should be tested regularly and updated, as necessary. 
 
h See CDC=s critical biological agents list in Annex A. 
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Enhanced Collaboration Among Public Health Partners 
 
The first step toward information sharing is the effective collaboration among 
members of the public health community.  To accomplish this task, it is necessary to 
identify which agencies and organizations must be integrated.  For surveillance 
purposes, the public health system is much more than state and/or local health 
departments.  At the very least, the following organizations should coordinate 
information and share public health-related data: 
 
Surveillance Partners 
 
State health department 
Emergency Medical Services 
Social service agencies 
Hospitals 
Clinics and physicians 
Epidemiologists 
Medical examiner/coroner 
Laboratories 
 
County/health departments 
Dispatch/911 
Volunteer organizations 
Mental health professionals 
Poison centers 
Pharmacists 
Veterinary services 
 
Coordination among these agencies and organizations can be enhanced through 
activities such as the following: 
 
$ Identify and distribute points of contact and communications information to 
critical response partners. 
 
$ Provide education about public health surveillance, disease reporting, 
epidemiology, and response activities related to bioterrorism to public health 
response partners. 
 
$ Collaborate on educational activities on topics related to bioterrorism 
preparedness for the general public or general medical community. 
 
$ Provide or promote in-service training or Agrand rounds@ for the medical 
community. 
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• Develop and implement collaborative surveillance projects by utilizing 
traditional and non-traditional data sources. 
 
Enhanced Surveillance with Non-traditional Health Partners 
 
Once the state=s basic surveillance system is in place, the state may choose to 
implement enhanced surveillance systems.  These systems establish frequency 
thresholds for disease and health-related syndromes, which allow epidemiologists to 
detect aberrations.  These systems may utilize data such as 911 calls, ambulance 
activity, patient visits to urgent care or emergency departments, pharmaceutical 
inventories, calls to poison centers or nurse hotlines, school or work absenteeism, 
and detection of aberrations through rapid medical examiner reporting and 
veterinarian or animal health reporting.  
 
For more information about these specialized surveillance systems, contact CDC=s 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program at (404) 639-0385. 
 
 
Preparedness 
 
Many terrorism events would not be identified in the high profile, sudden-impact manner 
that most emergencies are portrayed.  Instead, the observant physician, veterinarian, 
laboratory technician, surveillance data entry clerk, etc., who recognizes an unusual 
illness or cluster of illnesses or increases in requests for medical services or a specific 
diagnosis, will most likely be the first to identify the event.  For this reason, training of all 
personnel associated with public health surveillance should be a priority of terrorism 
response preparedness. 
 
To aid public health surveillance preparedness, CDC recently developed a list of 
epidemiologic clues that may signal a bioterrorism event.  (See Exhibit 2.)i  By 
developing each aspect described in the Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic 
Capacity Checklist and in the Planning Guidance, the opportunity to recognize and 
respond to these early clues becomes a product of the improved public health 
infrastructure, rather than a chance discovery. j 
 
i Also see Wiener SL, Barrett J.  Biological warfare defense.  In: Trauma Management for Civilian and 
Military Physicians.  Philadelphia, PA: WB Saunders; 1986: 508-509. 
j While the epidemiologic clues were developed to identify a biological terrorism event, many of them may 
apply to a chemical attack, and all apply to an infectious disease outbreak. 
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Extraordinary measures are not necessary to develop a comprehensive terrorism health 
surveillance and epidemiologic network.  Initiating partnerships and developing new or 
pre-existing data links always have been components of public health systems, although 
those links rarely have been with emergency management or law enforcement 
agencies.  The potential risk for a terrorism event makes it imperative that any 
enhanced surveillance and epidemiologic system be integrated smoothly into routine 
public health activities.  Developing partnerships between public and private health-
care, emergency management, and law enforcement entities, while using current 
technology to promote timely disease identification and reporting, can improve the daily 
capacity of a community to respond to illness and disease regardless of magnitude.  
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Exhibit 2 
 
Epidemiologic Clues That May Signal a Covert Bioterrorism Attack 
 
$ Large number of ill persons with similar disease or syndrome. 
$ Large number of unexplained disease, syndrome or deaths. 
$ Unusual illness in a population. 
$ Higher morbidity and mortality than expected with a common disease or syndrome. 
$ Failure of a common disease to respond to usual therapy. 
$ Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent. 
$ Multiple unusual or unexplained disease entities coexisting in the same patient without 
other explanation. 
$ Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution. 
$ Multiple atypical presentations of disease agents. 
$ Similar genetic type among agents isolated from temporally or spatially distinct 
sources. 
$ Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of agent. 
$ Endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence. 
$ Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, domestic or foreign. 
$ Atypical aerosol, food, or water transmission. 
$ Ill people presenting near the same time. 
$ Deaths or illness among animals that precedes or accompanies illness or death in 
humans. 
$ No illness in people not exposed to common ventilation systems, but illness among 
those people in proximity to the systems. 
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Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Checklist 
 
Core Surveillance and Epidemiologic Planning Y 
e 
s 
N 
O 
 
1. Have you designated a coordinator to health surveillance and epidemiology activities 
relative to a biological or chemical incident? 
 
  
 
  
 
2. Can the coordinator be contacted 24 hours per day? 
 
  
 
  
 
3. Have you designated appropriate staff to conduct epidemiologic investigations in the 
event of suspected or confirmed biological or chemical incidents? 
1. Rapid-response epidemiologic team? 
2. Rapid -response laboratory team? 
3. Real-time health surveillance set-up team (emergency or specialized)? 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
4. Have designated staff been briefed on their mission, roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities? 
 
  
 
  
 
5. Have you assured the legal authority for surveillance of biological or chemical 
incidents by the following: 
1. Including cases of diseases suspected or confirmed to be caused by high-
priority bioterrorism agents on the reportable diseases list (anthrax, botulism, 
brucellosis, plague, smallpox, tularemia)? 
b.  Including Aany unusual disease or manifestation of illness@ on the reportable 
diseases list? 
c.  Including Aany unusual cluster of disease or manifestation of illness@ whether 
or not on the reportable diseases list? 
d.  Including the legal authority to conduct surveillance for any unusual cluster of 
diseases or manifestation of illness whether or not on the reportable 
diseases list? 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
6. Have you distributed or publicized bioterrorism-updated reportable diseases lists to 
appropriate health-care providers? 
 
  
 
  
 
7. Have you established communications with the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) regional emergency coordinators to develop local surveillance 
and response plans? 
 
  
 
  
 
8. Have you established communications with other health-care providers to develop 
local surveillance and response plans? 
Check all that apply! 
  Emergency departments at hospitals or urgent care centers  
  Hospitals (Infection Control, Infectious Diseases, Laboratories, Pharmacies) 
  Occupational health clinics   Mental health agencies   
  Pharmacies     Epidemiologists 
 
  
 
  
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Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Checklist 
 
Core Surveillance and Epidemiologic Planning Y 
e 
s 
N 
O 
  Infectious disease specialists   Health Maintenance Organizations 
  Social services agencies   Poison Control Centers  
 
 
 
9. Have you established communications with law enforcement agencies to develop 
local surveillance and response plans? 
Check all that apply! 
  Local law enforcement   Local FBI office   Correctional facilities 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
10.  Have you established communications with emergency responders to develop local 
surveillance and response plans? 
Check all that apply! 
  911 dispatchers   EMS and ambulance workers   Police   Fire 
 
  
 
  
 
11.  Have you established communications with other agencies to develop local 
surveillance and response plans? 
Check all that apply! 
  Emergency management agencies (local and state) 
  Medical examiners, coroners, funeral directors 
  Veterans Administration   
  Department of Natural Resources or Environmental Protection Agency 
  Military bases (Department of Defense, National Guard) 
  Local food-safety inspectors (Food and Drug Administration, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture) 
 
  
 
  
 
12.  Have you established communications with other available resources to develop 
local surveillance and response plans? 
Check all that apply! 
  Laboratories (clinical, commercial, and veterinary) 
  Poison centers    Veterinarians 
 
  
 
  
 
13.  Have you developed an emergency or around-the-clock communications network to 
respond to biological and chemical incidents, including the following: 
a.  Emergency or real-time reporting of biological or chemical-related diseases or 
illness? 
b.  Immediate notification of surveillance/epidemiologic response personnel, such 
as state or local epidemiologist, laboratory director, and emergency 
management officials? 
c.  Broadcast fax or e-mail capability or other means of emergency dissemination of 
information (e.g., Web site)? 
To health-care providers? 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 19 
Chapter 3:  General Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Considerations 
  
 
  
Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Checklist 
 
Core Surveillance and Epidemiologic Planning Y 
e 
s 
N 
O 
To the public? 
 
14.  Have you enhanced collaboration between public health and surveillance partners 
by the following: 
a.  Using broadcast fax or e-mail capability or other means of emergency 
dissemination of information (i.e., Web site)? 
b.  Identifying points of contact and communications? 
c.  Providing educational seminars about public health surveillance and what 
diseases to report and where, when, and how to report them? 
d.  Partnering on educational activities for the general public and general medical 
community about relevant conditions and syndromes and the role of public 
health in terrorism preparedness? 
e.  Providing in-service training or Agrand rounds@ on terrorism preparedness? 
f.  Partnering on collaborative surveillance projects? 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
15.  Have you trained public health staff on issues related to possible terrorism events, 
including surveillance, epidemiology, and infectious disease outbreak 
investigations? 
 
  
 
  
 
16.  Have you developed training manuals for public health staff and terrorism response 
partners? 
 
  
 
  
 
17.  Have you conducted or participated in exercises to test the adequacy of the public 
health surveillance system and epidemiologic response? 
 
  
 
  
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Health Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Checklist 
 
Advanced Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation Checklist 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1. Have you initiated a surveillance system for the early detection of terrorism 
events by the following: 
a. Identifying influenza-like illnesses, rashes, or other syndromes of interest 
for inclusion in disease reporting? 
b. Establishing reporting mechanisms with any of the following systems? 
Check all that apply! 
  EMS/911 dispatch 
  Poison centers 
  Health system patient hotlines 
  Unusual deaths or medical examiner reports 
  Veterinarians and animal clinics    
  Emergency department or intensive-care unit admissions 
  Other 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Have you improved timeliness of developed electronic reporting from any of the 
following:  
Check all that apply! 
  Clinical laboratories    Hospital information systems 
  Emergency departments   Vital records 
  Other 
 
  
 
  
 
3.  Have you developed links with new data sources and systems, such as those listed 
below, to enhance biological and chemical incident detection and response? 
Check all that apply! 
  HHS regional emergency coordinators    Pharmacies  
  Health maintenance organizations   Emergency responders 
  Hospital discharge records     FBI 
  Veterinarians and animal clinics    Other 
  Poison centers  
 
  
 
  
 
4.  Have you developed written protocols for epidemiologists and disease practitioners 
to use in collecting and storing laboratory samples? 
 
  
 
  
 
5.  Have you identified a point of contact at local and state levels to answer questions 
about laboratory samples? 
 
  
 
  
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Chapter 4 
LABORATORY IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF 
BIOLOGICAL THREAT AGENTS 
  
 
General Laboratory Identification and Characterization Planning 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  2.3] 
 
This portion of the Planning Guidance focuses primarily on establishing and enhancing 
the core capacity of public health laboratories to respond to biological terrorism.  In 
addition, this planning process can serve to establish an enhanced system involving 
hospital laboratories, commercial reference laboratories, public health laboratories, and 
highly specialized federal laboratories to strengthen diagnostic capability for all 
infectious diseases in general.  
 
Integration of Laboratories into the Response 
 
In cooperation with the Association of Public Health Laboratories and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and through the CDC Bioterrorism Cooperative 
agreement, CDC established a multi-level Laboratory Response Network (LRN) for 
bioterrorism.  The LRN comprises local, state, and federal laboratories and facilitates 
sample collection, transport, testing, surge capacity, and training for laboratory 
readiness to identify critical biological agents.  Clinical and public health laboratories 
in the network are identified by increasing levels of proficiency from Level A to Level 
D.   Currently, all 50 state public health laboratories are registered members of the 
LRN.  Level B/C designation is agent-specific, which necessitates participation in a 
wider laboratory network.  State Public Health Laboratory Directors arrange for 
access to the LRN.k 
 
Laboratory Capabilities/Capacities 
 
Identifying the capability and capacity of each laboratory in your jurisdiction is the 
first step in the laboratory planning process.  Each public health laboratory and 
clinical laboratory in your health jurisdiction should be assessed to determine its 
appropriate level of capability within the LRN.   
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Most laboratories in the United States have only Level A capabilities.  The capability 
of those laboratories to identify most bioterrorism agents is limited; the ability to 
identify an event rests on their knowledge of and rapid access to the nearest Level 
B/C laboratory. 
 
Through CDC=s Web site URL: www.cdc.gov, all laboratories have access to Level 
A protocols for ruling out certain agents and forwarding those samples to more 
advanced laboratories.   Additionally, Level B/C laboratories registered as members 
of the LRN have access to a password-protected Web site that provides protocols 
for confirmatory testing, susceptibility testing, molecular typing, toxicity testing, and 
transport to the next highest level laboratory.   For laboratories concerned with 
responses to bioterrorism events, the chief benefit of belonging to the network is 
access to approved protocols that satisfy both public health and law enforcement 
requirements.  Adhering to these protocols will be critical to the rapid identification of 
a public health emergency and will help law enforcement apprehend the 
perpetrators. 
 
A laboratory=s capacity to detect, isolate, and identify specific agents rapidly and 
accurately is critical to the overall response to a bioterrorism event.  Quality control 
and assurance protocols, approved specimen-handling procedures, and approved 
training and techniques, using qualified staff, are necessary for each laboratory to 
fulfill the investigative needs of its surveillance, epidemiologic, and law enforcement 
partners.  
 
Points of Contact 
 
Response plans should include a list consisting of each laboratory participating in 
the state network, its capability level, and the appropriate contact person.  Higher-
level (B/C) laboratories in the network must be capable of receiving and testing 
samples on a 24/7 basis.   
 
Surge Capacity 
 
The LRN anticipated the need for laboratory surge capacity in the event of a large-
scale event.  Each LRN laboratory should identify the closest laboratory of equal or 
higher level capability to provide surge capacity, if needed.  LRN members can 
conduct an on-line search for the closest equal or higher-level laboratory to their 
location through the password protected LRN Web site. 
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Obtaining Reagents 
 
All reagents required for performing Level B/C testing can be ordered on-line 
through the password protected LRN Web site by members who are registered and 
approved at the corresponding levels.   Plans should include having adequate 
supplies on hand to permit routine proficiency testing and preparedness for a 
potential bioterrorism event.  
 
Use of State Laboratories vs. CDC Laboratories 
 
The LRN was established to facilitateBas rapidly as possibleBthe identification, 
confirmation, and characterization of bioterrorism threat agents.  The state public 
health laboratory most often will be the appropriate laboratory to submit samples for 
higher level testing. 
 
If a public health laboratory needs additional assistance in identifying or 
characterizing a biological threat agent, specimens may be sent to CDC=s Rapid 
Response and Advanced Technology (RRAT) Laboratory.  The RRAT Laboratory 
serves as the point of entry for all suspected or confirmed biological threat agents.  
CDC also will provide surge capacity, if needed.  All specimens suspected of 
smallpox or viral hemorrhagic fever should be sent directly to the RRAT laboratory 
through the local FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Coordinator. 
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Laboratory Identification and Characterization Checklist 
General  Yes 
 
No 
1 Is the state public health laboratory represented in the emergency planning 
process? 
 
  
 
  
2. Does your plan include a listing of all the member laboratories in your state 
Laboratory Response Network, including the following: 
a. Each laboratory=s capability (Level A-C)? 
b. Contact information for each laboratory lead person (available on a 24/7 
basis)? 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
3. Have you identified the laboratories in your state that have the capacity to begin 
testing within 4 hours and maintain testing 24hrs/day for a minimum of 3 days? 
 
  
 
  
4. Have you worked with the WMD Coordinator of your local FBI field office to 
establish guidelines for chain of custody procedures? 
 
  
 
  
5. Have you established and distributed guidelines on specimen collection, 
packaging, labeling, and shipping to state network and federal laboratories? 
 
  
 
  
6. Do you have a system in place to safely and efficiently transport samples 
between laboratories in your state laboratory network? 
 
  
 
  
7. Have you established and distributed to all network laboratories in your state 
guidelines for the rapid reporting of suspected bioterrorism-related threat agents 
to the following response partners: 
a. Local health department epidemiologist? 
b. State health department epidemiologist? 
c. Local law enforcement? 
d. State law enforcement? 
e. Federal law enforcement? 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
8. Can the state health department receive electronic laboratory reports from 
diagnostic service providers?  If yes, are reports received from the following? 
a. Private laboratories? 
b. Commercial laboratories? 
c. Hospital laboratories? 
d. Local health department laboratories? 
e. State health department laboratories? 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 26 
Chapter 5:  Consequence Management of a Public Health Event 
  
 
 
Chapter 5 
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OF A PUBLIC HEALTH EVENT 
  
 
Consequence Management Planning 
 
Consequence Management includes measures to protect public health and safety; 
restore essential government services; and provide emergency relief to governments, 
businesses, and people adversely affected by the terrorism event (4).  Presidential 
Decision Directive 39l assigned states the primary authority to respond to the 
consequences of terrorism and authorized the federal government to provide assistance 
to states.  Consequence Management activities can be separated into two distinct yet 
overlapping phases:  the response phase and the recovery phase. 
 
Public health departments should perform a variety of consequence management 
functions to protect public health and safety.  Some of these functions are listed below.  
Roles and responsibilities for each of these activities should be identified in the 
terrorism response plan with response procedures detailed in supporting SOPs.  
  
 
Response Phase Activities 
 
The response phase of a terrorism event covers the initial actions taken as the result of 
an actual or potential release of an agent.  This phase includes the actions taken to 
eliminate the source of the agent (if known), provision of medical treatment to those 
affected, and any measures taken to preclude the exposure of additional people, either 
through secondary exposure from contagious biological agents or, for chemical events,  
from environmental contamination (5).  A variety of the response activities required 
during the response phase fall directly within the health department=s jurisdiction.  
 
Command and Control 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  2.1; 4.1; 5.1; 8.2.9] 
 
Command and Control were described briefly in Chapter 2.  The following sections 
outline specific activities that should be planned to manage the event effectively.  
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Emergency Operations 
 
The plan should identify the location from which the health department would 
conduct its emergency operations.  This site should be secure and capable of 24-
hour operations with sufficient equipment, backup power, and a communications 
system.  Among other activities, health department personnel could coordinate 
the triage of patients and use of resources (e.g., bed space, staffing) among 
various health-care facilities.  
 
In moderate to large-scale situations, the state may manage the response 
operations from a central Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  
Representatives from all responding agencies can work at the EOC to coordinate 
policy decisions and manage necessary resources.  In general, the EOC is 
activated when one or more of the following occur: 
 
$ Outside resources are needed to accomplish the work required by the 
incident. 
 
$ The incident requires the coordination of multiple agencies.  
 
$ The event covers a large geographic area or involves multiple jurisdictions 
(5). 
 
The plan should designate, by title, the public health personnel (and alternates) 
responsible for staffing the centralized, activated EOC. 
   
Conditions for Activation 
 
Once public health activities are integrated into the state emergency plan, the 
state should identify the official authorized to activate the public health provisions 
of the EOP and designate a chain of command for activation.  The state also 
should identify the criteria, if any, that health departments can use to activate 
their emergency procedures independently of activating the state=s entire EOP 
and designate a chain of command for such activation. 
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The plan should specify events that trigger plan activation.  Specific scenarios 
are not needed, but the plan should include generic guidance on the types or 
magnitude of events that trigger activation.  
 
Interagency Coordination 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  4.1] 
 
    The plan should describe the relationship between state and local response 
efforts.  It also should describe when federal assets would be requested.  The 
plan should describe procedures for coordinating the efforts of the various 
agencies and levels of government that are likely to respond to a terrorism threat 
or event.  
 
Communications 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  2.1.2; 2.1.3; 2.2.8; 3.2; 3.3] 
 
The plan should include measures to ensure that public health agencies are 
capable of reliable communications with their own response personnel as well as 
with all other agencies involved in the emergency response.   
 
The communications system should 
 
$ Disseminate accurate information to first responders, health-care 
providers, and decision-makers; 
 
$ Include protocols for notifying EOCs in the affected area to facilitate 
communication and coordination in the event of a terrorism event; 
 
$ Include a sufficient number of radios and radio frequencies to facilitate 
communication between necessary organizations; 
 
$ Require that a contact list for all critical local and state public health, 
medical, law enforcement, and emergency management personnel be 
developed, distributed as necessary, and verified at least monthly; and 
 
$ Include provisions to disseminate information rapidly about diagnosis and 
patient management for high-risk terrorism threat agents to local and state 
health-care providers, hospitals, clinics, laboratories, and pharmacies. 
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Emergency communications must cover internal and external communications. 
Thus, the plan should accomplish the following: 
 
$ Describe the health department=s capability to alert and communicate 
with its emergency personnel including those in the health department, in 
the state EOC, and any field response units. 
 
$ Identify, by title, the person and alternates authorized to communicate and 
receive emergency information between the health department and other 
members of the public health community. 
 
$ Identify, by title, the person authorized to communicate and receive 
emergency information between the health department, emergency 
response agencies, and emergency response personnel.   
 
Communications Testing 
 
The plan should contain procedures for periodic (e.g., monthly) testing of 
primary and back-up emergency communications links within the public health 
community and between the state health department and response agencies. 
 
Event Notification 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  2.1.3; 2.2.8] 
 
Incident Assessment 
 
The plan should identify, by title, the person and alternates responsible for 
assessing the threat to public health and consequences of the incident.  Also, 
it should describe how event-related data will be received and how the 
assessment information will be distributed and used. 
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Notification Authority 
 
The plan should identify, by title, the person and alternates responsible for the 
following: 
 
$ Interagency notification. 
 
$ Notification of the news media. 
 
$ Notification of the public. 
 
These people and their 24-hour contact numbers (e.g., telephone, pager) 
should be identified in the public health plan, even if those responsible for 
public notification or media coordination are not public health officials. 
 
Notification Procedures 
 
The plan should specify when and how key public health officials would be 
notified about the terrorism threat or event.  It also should describe the 
notification and coordination procedures when multiple agencies or 
jurisdictions must be notified.   
 
The plan should include a list of contacts and 24-hour access numbers for all 
key officials and agencies in the state.  Local contacts also should be 
included, where appropriate.  At a minimum, the list should include the 
following:  
 
$ A 24-hour notification point of contact, with telephone and pager 
numbers, for each county and municipal health department in the 
state. 
 
$ A 24-hour notification point of contact, with telephone and pager 
numbers, for the state health departments of each bordering state. 
 
Ensuring that only up-to-date copies of contact lists are maintained within the 
response system is often difficult.  The following actions can minimize 
reliance on out-of-date contact lists: 
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$ Require that all emergency contact lists be reviewed at least monthly 
and updated whenever changes in personnel occur.  
 
$ Limit distribution of emergency contact list to those responsible for 
contacting emergency employees.   
 
$ Maintain a record of personnel who receive copies of the emergency 
contact list and directly provide updated copies of the contact list, when 
they are developed, to those people.   
 
CDC developed recommended notification procedures for public health 
department leaders in the event of a bioterrorism incident.m  These 
procedures focus on activities at the local level; however, they contain 
procedures for state-level notifications as well.  States should consider these 
procedures in developing protocols for notifying the FBI, CDC, and other 
agencies.  If adopted, these same notification procedures also should be 
used in a chemical event. 
 
Public Alert  
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  3.1] 
 
The plan should describe the procedures and means by which the public will be 
notified about a public health emergency.  These notification procedures should 
 
$ Describe the means by which the public will be notified about a public 
health emergency; 
 
$ Describe how the notifications will be coordinated with other response 
agencies;  
 
$ Provide for notification of non-English speaking residents; 
 
$ Describe how the protective action messages will provide the details 
necessary for the public to implement the recommended protective 
actions; and 
 
m CDC=s notification procedures are available at URL: www.bt.cdc.gov/protocols.asp.  
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$ Describe how the notification procedures will be tested at least annually. 
 
Public Education and Emergency Public Information 
 
If not already in place, the health department should develop a comprehensive 
public education program that covers public health matters of interest to the 
population.  The program should include readily available information about 
reasonable risks associated with biological or chemical agents.  
 
The public education program should be capable of providing health-related 
educational materials to a state=s non-English speaking residents.  It also should 
ensure that published public education materials are regularly reviewed and 
revised, when necessary.   
 
States must have established procedures for providing the news media with 
timely and accurate public information to expedite the release of emergency 
information in the event of a terrorism incident.  To prevent the dissemination of 
inconsistent or conflicting data, one organization or person should be designated 
to coordinate all public information and speak to the news media.  
 
Emergency public information can be coordinated through the use of a Joint 
Information Center (JIC)Ba central location where representatives of all 
responding agencies gather to coordinate the dissemination of information to the 
public and news media.  The JIC should be a vital component of a coordinated 
Joint Information System (JIS).   The JIS should establish protocols for 
maintaining effective two-way information flow between the Public Information 
Officers staffing the JIC and the responding agencies= operations personnel and 
decision-makers. 
 
Social stigmatism occurs when people outside an affected community ostracize 
those residing in a potentially contaminated area (6).  Social stigmatism has 
occurred after some large-scale accidental chemical events and must be 
considered as a possible consequence of a chemical or biological terrorism 
incident.  Because social stigmatism could hamper recovery efforts and 
profoundly affect the long-term well being of the affected community, public 
education aimed at minimizing an event=s societal impact should be developed. 
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Special Populations 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  7.1] 
 
The plan should identify the locations of special population groups.   These 
groups include people in jails, prisons, and other detention facilities, as well as 
people in intermediate- and long-term care nursing facilities.  Care must be taken 
to ensure that the emergency public heath needs of these and other identified 
special populations are considered and protected through provisions contained in 
the plan. 
 
Mental Healthn 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.19] 
 
Emergency situations place significant stress on both responders and victims.  
The plan should include provisions for identifying and obtaining mental heath 
resources for those affected by an emergency situation.  Special care should be 
taken to ensure that emergency personnel receive the mental health support they 
may need, especially when the response personnel or any of their family 
members are victims of the terrorism.   
 
The acts of terrorists are deliberate.  The knowledge that the deaths, illnesses, 
and injuries were intentional can intensify the mental health consequences of the 
event.  Research indicates that children and the elderly react differently to 
disaster-related stress than do average adults (7, 8).  These differences should 
be considered and planned for in the provision of emergency-related mental 
health services. 
 
Mass Fatalitieso 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.28; 7.2.11] 
 
Emergencies generating a significant number of fatalities can pose special 
challenges.  Health departments should work with medical examiners or  
 
n Information pertaining to community mental health issues can be obtained from the Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration at URL: www.samhsa.gov  or by calling (301) 443-2817. 
o Assistance with emergency mortuary management and dealing with a large number of decedents can be 
obtained from the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency Preparedness, at 
(800)-USA-NDMS.  
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coroners to develop protocols for dealing safely with a large number of 
casualties. 
 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.27; 7.2] 
 
A release of selected biological or chemical agents will necessitate rapid access 
to large quantities of pharmaceuticals or vaccines and, possibly, other medical 
supplies.  Unless special stockpiles are created, such quantities may not be 
readily available in the locations where they would be needed.   
 
CDC=s fiscal year 1999 budget included funds to establish a NPS.  To ensure 
the effective distribution of stockpile assets, the state must develop SOPs for 
their receipt, security, and distribution.  Appendix II includes background 
information on this subject.  Detailed guidance for developing these SOPs can be 
obtained by contacting NPS: 
 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program  
4770 Buford Highway 
Mailstop F-23  
Atlanta, GA 30341  
(770) 488-7516 
 
Worker Protection 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.11; 7.2.10] 
 
Once an event has been identified, it is imperative that responders do not 
become victims.  Those responding to the incident and dealing with patients must 
be protected appropriately.    
 
An employer is ultimately responsible for the safety of his or her employees.  
Employers accomplish this duty by enforcing worker protection standards that 
have been established by the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration or its state-level counterpart.  Health departments should provide 
post-event technical assistance to ensure that those responding to an incident 
scene, dealing with potentially contaminated casualties, or performing any 
necessary decontamination do so safely and in a manner that protects the public. 
  In order for this technical assistance to be effective, the health department 
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should liaise with responder organizations for planning a terrorism event 
response as part of its pre-event planning.   
 
Patient Decontamination 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.20; 5.1.1.21; 5.1.1.22; 
5.1.1.23; 8.2.5.5] 
 
Emergency plans should incorporate provisions for performing effective 
decontamination, when necessary, after a terrorism event.  Although it is unlikely 
that health department personnel will participate actively in decontamination, 
effective public health planning and public health consultation during the threat or 
incident could limit unnecessary decontamination substantially and ensure that 
needed decontamination actions are timely, sufficient, and effective. 
 
Mass Care  
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.17; 7.1.3] 
 
Although it is doubtful that health departments would establish or manage mass 
care facilities directly, they should play a role in protecting the health and well 
being of displaced people.   Health departments also should work with the 
organizations responsible for mass care to prevent injury to and illness among 
displaced persons.   
 
 
Recovery Phase Activities 
 
The recovery phase is the period from the end of the response phase until  
 
$ The affected area has been reoccupied without the need for protective 
equipment, and there is no short- or long-term health risk to humans; and 
 
$ Other typical operations have resumed without any restrictions stemming from 
the event (5). 
 
Although defined as activities separate from and following the response phase, recovery 
phase activities often will begin before the response phase ends.  In addition, actions 
taken during the response phase can benefit or hinder recovery efforts.  Health 
departments= primary recovery responsibilities include the following: 
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$ Studying morbidity and mortality associated with the event and documenting 
exposure. 
 
$ Conducting long-term medical follow-up of exposed people.  
 
$ Determining when it is safe to return to a contaminated area. 
 
Long-Term Medical Follow-Up 
 
Depending on the agent used and the method of dispersal, exposure to agents could 
cause severe illness and deaths.  Some affected people could suffer long-term 
health and medical difficulties involving a wide range of organ systems.  Health 
departments should play an integral role in identifying people with exposure-related 
illnesses and in working with their physicians to track their long-term care.  Tracking 
the health of people exposed to biological or chemical agents could significantly 
improve our ability to provide early detection and intervention, thus improving 
treatment effectiveness. 
 
Morbidity and Mortality Study 
 
During and after many natural disasters, public health personnel canvas an affected 
community and document the health and medical effects of the event on the 
population.  These investigations include identifying disaster-related injuries and 
tracking endemic diseases to ensure that there is no outbreak.p  Health departments 
should conduct similar morbidity and mortality studies after a terrorism event.  
 
Post-terrorism investigations could evaluate the effect of the agent released, the 
dose, and the selected delivery system on the number and severity of casualties.  
Health departments also could investigate the effectiveness of pre-hospital and 
hospital responses and outcome effectiveness, and they could examine such 
secondary issues as evacuation-related traffic accidents. 
 
 
p AIf an organism is not present in the area and has not been introduced after the disaster, the disease 
poses no threat regardless of environmental conditions.@  From, Public Health Consequences of Disasters, 
Noji E. ed. Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p. 93 .   
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Environmental Issues 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1.1.10; 5.1.1.11.] 
 
Health departments are unlikely to be the agencies directly responsible for dealing 
with the environmental consequences of a biological or chemical-related terrorism 
event; however, public health officials have an important role to play in responding to 
post-incident environmental issues.  Site characterization, environmental 
decontamination, and reentry levels have public health ramifications in which health 
departments should play an active advisory role.    
 
Site Characterization 
 
The health department=s role in site characterization stems from its responsibility 
to monitor the public=s long-term health and safety.  Specifically, health 
departments should work with their state=s environmental protection agency to 
determine the source or location of the illness or outbreak and develop a 
sampling plan to characterize the site so that necessary follow-up of public health 
dose investigations can be accomplished. 
 
Environmental Decontamination 
 
As with patient decontamination, the type, form, and amount of agent affect the 
decision of whether or not to decontaminate the environment.  The health 
department=s participation in discussions about this matter will ensure that, when 
necessary, the decontamination is sufficient to ensure safe reentry into the 
contaminated area and that, during the procedure, personnel protect themselves 
and the environment. 
 
Clean-up/Reentry Levels 
 
Health departments should help determine whether an area needs to be cleaned 
up before reentry.  When clean-up is necessary, the health department must 
ensure that reentry standards are in place to protect those returning to their 
homes.   Health departments also should determine any limitations on future land 
use or potential health concerns stemming from the event. 
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Consequence Management Planning Checklist 
 
Command and Control 
 
Yes 
 
No 
6. Have you designated a location for health department emergency operations?    
 
  
7. Have you designated the public health employees responsible for staffing the 
state=s Emergency Operations Center (EOC)? 
 
  
 
  
8. Have you described the relationship between state and local response efforts and 
the federal response efforts and described procedures to coordinate the efforts of 
the different levels of government during an emergency? 
 
  
 
  
9. Have you determined under what conditions the plan would be activated?    
 
  
10. Have you identified local health-care resources (e.g., beds, staffing, ventilators, 
vacant hospital buildings)? 
 
  
 
  
Communications  Yes 
 
No 
1. Have you explained how information will be disseminated accurately to first 
responders, the public, health-care providers, and decision-makers? 
 
  
 
  
2. Have you included the protocol for notifying EOCs in the affected area to facilitate 
communication and coordination in the event of a terrorism event? 
 
  
 
  
3. Have you identified sufficient radio frequencies at the state level to facilitate 
communication between necessary organizations? 
 
  
 
  
4. Have you developed, distributed, as necessary, and maintained a list of contact 
information for all critical local or state public health, medical, law enforcement, and 
emergency management personnel?  
a.  Is the list updated at least monthly? 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
5.  Have you described the state=s capability to disseminate information within 2 hours 
to local and state health-care providers, hospitals, clinics, laboratories, and 
pharmacies about diagnosis and patient management for high-risk terrorism threat 
agents? 
 
  
 
  
6.  Have you described the health department=s capability to alert and communicate 
with its field response units? 
 
  
 
  
7.  Have you identified, by title, the person and alternates authorized to communicate 
necessary public health information among the health department and emergency 
response agencies?.  
 
  
 
  
8.  Have you identified, by title, the person and alternates authorized to communicate 
necessary public health information between the health department and other health 
agencies and organizations? 
 
  
 
  
9.  Have you communicated in advance with emergency department directors and 
hospital administrators in the community to facilitate coordination of emergency 
activities? 
 
  
 
  
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Consequence Management Planning Checklist 
 
Event Notification 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Have you identified, by title, the person and alternates responsible for the following: 
a.  Assessing the public health consequences of the emergency incident? 
b.  Accomplishing interagency notification? 
c.  Notifying the news media or the public?  (These people should be identified and 
contact telephone numbers included, even if those responsible for public 
notification or news media coordination are not public health officials.) 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
2.  Have you specified the notification process for key public health officials? 
 
  
 
  
 
3.  Have you identified the ability to receive emergency notification and public health 
information on a 24-hour basis? 
 
  
 
   
 
Public Alert 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Have you described the procedures by which the public will be notified of a public 
health emergency? 
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Have you provided for notification of non-English speaking residents? 
 
  
 
  
 
3.  Have you described how the public notification procedures will be tested at least 
annually? 
 
  
 
  
 
4.  Have you described how the public protective action messages will provide the 
detail necessary to implement the recommended protective actions? 
 
  
 
   
 
Public Education and Emergency Public Information 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Has the state established a comprehensive public education program on public 
health matters of interest to the population as well as the risks associated with 
biological or chemical agents?  If yes-- 
a.  Does the public education program provide for the education of non-English 
speaking residents? 
b.  Have procedures been established for revising the public education materials 
annually or whenever significant changes warrant revision?  
c.  Have procedures been established for providing the new media with ongoing 
information about public health initiatives and public health-related emergency 
preparedness efforts? 
d.  Have criteria been established for releasing information to the public about 
possible terrorism threats? 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Does a protocol exist for notifying or warning the community of potential hazards 
resulting from a biological or chemical release?  If yes-- 
a.  Does this protocol have provisions for informing the public of what hazards to 
expect, what precautions to take, and whether evacuation or shelter-in-place is 
required? 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
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Public Education and Emergency Public Information 
 
Yes 
 
No 
b.  Has the protocol been reviewed with members of the new media? 
c.  Does the public information program include procedures for releasing 
emergency information to non-English speaking residents in a timely and 
effective manner? 
d.  In the event of a possible terrorism incident, has one organization or person 
been designated to coordinate or speak to the news media? 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
Consequence Management Planning Checklist 
 
Special Populations 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1. Does the plan identify the locations of special population groups including jails, 
prisons, and other detention facilities as well as intermediate- and long-term care 
nursing facilities? 
 
  
 
  
 
Consequence Management Planning Checklist 
 
Mental Health 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Have you developed the capability to identify and obtain mental health resources 
rapidly in an emergency situation? 
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Are procedures in place for notifying both disaster victims and emergency workers of 
the availability of mental health services? 
 
  
 
  
 
3.  Have you tailored the mental health counseling to the age of the person seeking 
mental health services? 
 
  
 
  
 
Mass Fatalities 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Have you developed protocols for dealing with a large number of casualties? 
 
  
 
  
 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Have you developed a plan for the receipt, security, and distribution of stockpile 
assets? 
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Is the NPS plan integrated into the terrorism plan? 
 
  
 
  
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Patient Decontamination 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Have you identified the agencies responsible for patient decontamination? 
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Have you established protocols for identifying when decontamination will and will not 
be required? 
 
  
 
  
 
3.  Have you specified the public health community=s role in ensuring that 
decontamination of potentially contaminated people is both timely and thorough? 
 
  
 
  
 
4.  Have you identified the public health community=s role in training medical personnel 
to decontaminate ill or injured people safely before their entry into a hospital setting? 
 
  
 
  
 
5.  Have you established procedures for educating and informing the public of 
decontamination procedures in the event of a biological or chemical incident? 
 
  
 
  
 
6.  Have you worked with your medical examiner or coroner to develop protocols for 
balancing the competing interests of evidence preservation and decontamination of 
bodies for the immediate fatalities of a biological or chemical incident? 
 
  
 
  
 
Consequence Management Planning Checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
Mass Care 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Are you aware of the location(s) of identified mass care centers in your state? 
 
  
 
  
 
2.  Have you worked with mass care providers to ensure proper documentation of all 
emergency and nonemergency medical care occurring at mass care centers? 
 
  
 
  
 
Consequence Management Planning Checklist 
 
Environmental Issues 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1.  Do you have an agreement in place with the state environmental protection agency 
to develop a joint post-incident environmental sampling plan? 
 
  
 
  
 
 
2.  Have you developed procedures for ensuring that environmental samples will meet 
public health study needs? 
 
  
 
  
 
 
3.  Have you established protocols for identifying when environmental decontamination 
will and will not be required? 
 
  
 
  
 
 
4.  Have you specified the role of the public health community in ensuring that 
environmental decontamination is done in a manner that protects worker and public 
safety? 
 
  
 
  
 
 
5.  Have you identified criteria for reentry into potentially contaminated areas? 
 
  
 
  
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A biological agent in an aerosolized state presents the agent=s greatest potential for 
mass dissemination and large-scale impact.  In some countries, biological agents have 
been engineered for optimal dispersal and dissemination as small-particle aerosols.  In 
the former Soviet Union in 1979 in Sverdlosk (now known by its pre-Soviet name 
Ekaterinburg), 66 people were killed when a small amount of weaponized Bacillus 
anthracis was released accidentally from a bioweapons factory (9). 
 
In the event of a bioterrorism attack, an effective response will require focusing 
necessary public health resources on managing the outbreak of an infectious disease.  
These resources include surveillance and epidemiologic expertise; use of specialized 
drugs, vaccines, and other medical supplies; laboratory diagnosis skills; and medical 
recommendations, such as prophylaxis guidelines and various quarantine-related 
issues. 
 
 
Definition 
 
CDC defines biological terrorism as an intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or their 
toxins for the purpose of harming or killing American citizens.  In addition to 
aerosolization, food, water, or insects must be considered as potential vehicles of 
transmission for biological weapons.  Public health officials must be prepared to 
address varied biological agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the United 
States. 
 
The highest-priority agents, Category A Agents, include organisms that pose a risk to 
national security because they 
 
$ Can be easily disseminated or transmitted person-to-person; 
 
$ Cause high mortality and subsequently have a major public health impact; 
 
$ Might cause public panic and social disruption; and 
 
$ Require special action for public health preparedness. 
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CDC=s list of critical biological agents includes the following Category A Agents: 
 
 
Category A Agents 
 
Variola major (smallpox) 
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) 
Yersinia pestis (plague) 
Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism) 
Francisella tularensis (tularemia) 
Hemorrhagic fever (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, Lassa viruses) 
 
CDC recommends that other less critical agents (Category B and C Agents) also 
receive attention for bioterrorism preparedness.  These categories include new or 
Aemerging@ pathogens.  A subset of Category B agents includes pathogens that are 
foodborne or waterborne.  Category B agents include those that  
 
$ Are moderately easy to disseminate; 
$ Cause moderate morbidity and low mortality; and 
$ Require specific enhancements of CDC=s diagnostic capacity and enhanced 
disease surveillance. 
 
 
Category B Agents 
 
Coxiella burnetti (Q fever) 
Brucella species (brucellosis) 
Burkholderia mallei (glanders) 
Alphaviruses 
Venezuelan encephalomyelitis 
eastern and western equine            
encephalomyelitis 
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis  
(castor beans) 
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens 
Staphylococcus enterotoxin B 
 
Category B Agents 
Foodborne or Waterborne  
 
Salmonella species 
Shigella dysenteriae 
Escherichia coli O157:H7 
Vibrio cholerae 
Cryptosporidium parvum 
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Category C agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass 
dissemination in the future because of their 
 
$ Availability; 
$ Ease of production and dissemination; and 
$ Potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact. 
 
 
Category C Agents 
 
Nipah virus 
Hantaviruses 
Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses 
Tickborne encephalitis viruses 
Yellow fever virus 
Multidrug-resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
 
Preparedness for Category C agents requires ongoing research to improve disease 
detection, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention.  Knowing in advance which newly 
emergent pathogens terrorists might employ is not possible; therefore, it is imperative to 
link bioterrorism preparedness efforts with ongoing disease surveillance and outbreak 
response activities as defined in CDC=s emerging infectious disease strategy (10). 
 
 
Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  1.1, 2.2] 
 
To prepare fully, health department officials should remember that a bioterrorism event 
most likely would cause unusual cases of illness or death.  An observant physician, 
veterinarian, laboratory technician, or surveillance data-entry clerk may be critical to 
early detection.   
 
The two broad goals of surveillance related to bioterrorism preparedness and response 
are early detection of an event and enhanced disease tracking in the population during 
an emergency response.  Surveillance data must be linked to the appropriate authorities 
who will investigate unusual instances of health service utilization and unusual clusters 
of illness or deaths.  Surveillance planning should detail how surveillance information 
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will be investigated and how this information will be linked to other emergency response 
officials at the community and state levels.    
 
After an event, a proper emergency response to an epidemic will require enhanced 
surveillance activity to manage the outbreak and to monitor progress.  Planning may 
involve contingencies for augmenting existing surveillance activities and the surveillance 
workforce, active reporting, and enhanced information management capacity.  The 
state=s terrorism response plan should include considerations for utilizing other 
surveillance systems, such as Epi-X and the National Electronic Disease Surveillance 
System. 
 
 
Laboratory Diagnosis 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  2.3.1.1; 2.3.2; 8.2.5] 
 
Laboratory confirmation of a specimen will be extremely important during a bioterrorism 
response.  Plans should be in place to facilitate testing of the critical agents for 
biological preparedness.  The Laboratory Response Network exists to facilitate sample 
collection, transport, testing, and training for laboratory readiness for bioterrorism.  
Clinical and public health laboratories in the network are identified by increasing levels  
of sophistication ranging from Level A through Level D. 
 
 
Laboratory Capacity for Biological Agents 
 
Level A Laboratory 
 
Level A laboratories are public health and hospital laboratories with a certified 
biological safety cabinet as a minimum.  These laboratories have the ability to rule 
out specific agents and to forward organisms or specimens to higher-level 
laboratories for further testing.  
 
Level B Laboratory (Core Capacity) 
 
Level B laboratories are state and local public health laboratories with Biosafety 
Level (BSL) 2 facilities that incorporate BSL-3 practices and maintain the proficiency 
to adequately process environmental samples, rule in specific agents, and perform 
confirmatory and antibiotic susceptibility testing.  These laboratories can identify 
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appropriate higher-level laboratories and can forward samples to them for further 
testing.   
 
Level C Laboratory (Advanced Capacity) 
 
Level C Laboratories are BSL-3 facilities with the capability to perform nucleic acid 
amplification, molecular typing, and toxicity testing.  Level C laboratories can 
conduct all tests performed in Level B laboratories and can provide surge capacity, 
when needed.  Additionally, these laboratories will evaluate reagents and tests to 
facilitate their transfer for use in Level B laboratories. 
 
Level D Laboratory 
 
Level D Laboratories can conduct all tests performed in Levels A, B, and C 
laboratories.  They can validate new assays, detect genetic recombinants, provide 
specialized reagents, securely bank isolates, and possess BSL-3 and BSL-4 
biocontainment facilities.  For bioterrorism events affecting civilian populations, CDC 
is the Level D laboratory. 
 
Shipping 
 
All suspected or confirmed biological threat agents should be shipped in accordance 
with the procedures for general packaging requirements for transport of biological 
agents and clinical specimens as set forth in CDC=s Office of Health and Safety 
(OHS) publication, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th 
Edition, Appendix C.  This information may be accessed through the OHS Web site 
at URL: www.cdc.gov/od/ohs.   
 
Before sending samples or if you have questions about or problems with samples or 
sample shipment, call Dr. Meyer at (404) 639-0075/Pager (800) 314-1092.  
 
Ship samples to CDC at this address: 
 
CDC DASH 
ATTN: Dr. Richard Meyer 
1600 Clifton Road 
Atlanta, GA 30333 
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Medical Management  
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  7.2] 
 
The key issues associated with medical management of bioterrorism victims will be the 
provision of preventive services and the medical treatment of patients.  Preventive 
services involve the provision of antibiotics, vaccines, or other medications to prevent 
disease and death in exposed victims.   
 
Plans will need to predict supplementary staffing needs and identify auxiliary staff, 
determine equipment and resource requirements, and identify technical assistance that 
may be required.  In addition, provisions for properly documenting the treatment of 
victims should be specified.  The proper application of mass prophylaxis or 
immunization will involve complex coordination with other emergency response 
authorities and a vigorous campaign to inform the public.   
 
Policy should be developed to address priority emergency prophylaxis for  Aessential@ 
emergency personnel (11).  A specific list of the emergency personnel should be 
developed in advance.  If medication shortages develop during the early phases of the 
incident, the medication issuance may need to be limited to a 1- or 2-day course of 
treatment, pending identification of the agent.   
 
For the at-risk population, mass immunization may be needed.  Currently, this option 
primarily relates to smallpox planning.  Recommendations for immunization balance 
scientific evidence of benefits, costs, and risks against the risk posed by the biological 
agent.  Personnel administering the immunizations would require proper training.  
Staging sites should be planned in advance for distribution and delivery of vaccines.  
Planning for mass immunization should involve linkage with public health departments 
at the state and local levels.  
 
 
Restriction of Movement 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  6.2] 
 
State and Local Quarantine 
 
Current planning for responding to a bioterrorism-initiated outbreak should include 
an evaluation of the legal authorities that form the basis of traditional emergency  
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public health measures, such as quarantine and the mandatory administration of 
medications or vaccines.  Although such measures were a necessary and common 
component of infectious disease control in the United States at the turn of the 20th 
century, their use all but vanished 50 years later because the incidence of infectious 
disease declined due to better hygiene, antibiotics, and vaccines.    
Surveys of the laws that authorize state use of emergency public health measures, 
including one conducted in 1988 by the Institute of Medicine, suggest that they are 
antiquated and vary significantly from state to state (12).  With limited exceptions, 
public health officers have not been called upon to utilize emergency public health 
measures in an infectious disease setting since combating polio in the 1950s.  
Therefore, most laws that authorize such measures have not been tested against 
modern legal concerns.  Couple this with a recent worldwide resurgence in the 
incidence of infectious disease, and the need for appropriate emergency public 
health measures becomes obvious. 
 
Responding to a bioterrorism incident or large-scale infectious disease outbreak may 
require the use of a variety of emergency public health measures.  These may 
include quarantine, isolation, closing public places, seizing property, mandatory 
vaccination, travel restrictions, and disposal of the dead.  Because the most critical 
public health responses probably will be those taken immediately at the state and 
local levels, health officials and their lawyers should review the statutes, regulations, 
and ordinances that authorize these emergency public health measures and develop 
legally sound procedures for executing them. 
 
Federal Quarantine 
 
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services was granted the 
authority to issue regulations necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or 
spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States and 
from one state or possession into another (13).  These regulations, which are 
administered by CDC, are promulgated separately according to their geographic 
applicability; one set governs matters of interstate commerce, and the other governs 
arrivals into the United States. 
 
Restriction of People Moving Interstate 
 
The regulations that authorize the restriction of people moving interstate are 
found in 42 CFR Part 70.  These regulations contain a number of permitting and 
reporting requirements for people who travel from one state or possession to 
another, and they authorize the apprehension, detention, or conditional release 
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of such people to prevent the spread of specified communicable diseases.  In 
addition, these regulations authorize federal action in the event that measures 
taken by health authorities of any state or possession are insufficient to prevent 
the interstate spread of communicable diseases.  CDC's regulatory authority is 
limited to restricting the movement of people.  The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration retains similar interstate regulatory authority with respect to 
animals and other products that may transmit or spread human disease. 
 
Foreign Quarantine of Persons, Carriers, Animals, and Articles 
 
CDC's regulatory authority with respect to foreign arrivals is found in 42 CFR Part 
71.  These regulations authorize CDC to detain, isolate, or place under 
surveillance, people arriving in the United States who are reasonably believed to 
be infected with or to have been exposed to certain communicable diseases, 
provided that such action is considered necessary to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of those diseases.  The current list of diseases for which 
such actions are authorized includes cholera or suspected cholera, diphtheria, 
infectious tuberculosis, plague, suspected smallpox, yellow fever, and suspected 
viral hemorrhagic fevers--Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Congo-Crimean [sic], and 
others not yet isolated or named (14). 
 
The provisions of 42 CFR Part 71 also authorize certain measures with respect 
to carriers, animals, and articles arriving in the United States to the extent they 
transmit or spread human disease.  For example, carriers arriving in U.S. ports 
must report certain occurrences of illness or death aboard the carrier and are 
subject to inspection; dogs, cats, turtles, and nonhuman primates are subject to 
inspection and quarantine requirements; and imported etiologic agents, hosts, 
and vectors of human disease must be accompanied by a CDC-issued import 
permit. 
 
Federal Quarantine Administration  
 
The authority for carrying out the provisions of 42 CFR Parts 70 and 71 rests with 
the Director of CDC.  The Division of Quarantine, National Center for Infectious 
Diseases, administers both sets of CDC regulations on behalf of the agency.  CDC 
is reviewing the regulations currently and intends to update them to reflect present-
day concerns, including potential bioterrorism.  
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Consequence Management 
 
Response activities that should be consistent irrespective of the agent used are covered 
in Chapter 5.  The following supplementary guidance pertains specifically to a biological 
incident. 
 
Worker Protection 
 
Worker protection in response to biological terrorism should be determined by the 
type of hazard.  CDC anticipates that worker exposures to biological terrorism will 
likely fall into two scenarios: an occupational contact with an infected patient during 
a bioterrorism-related outbreak; or a potential occupational exposure involving 
recovery of a biological dissemination device. 
 
Occupational contact with an infected patient during a bioterrorism-related 
outbreak: 
 
Prior to recognition and during a recognized disease outbreak caused by an act 
of biological terrorism, workers may have contact with patients who are infected 
by the biological agent.   Most agents of bioterrorism are not transmitted from 
person-to-person, however, for agents such as smallpox or pneumonic plague, a 
worker is  at risk of acquiring infection from the patient.  Workers potentially at 
risk due to occupational exposure include: 
 
$ traditional first responders (police, fire, and EMS) who transport ill patients 
to medical facilities; 
 
$ health care workers who care for patients in hospitals, residential facilities, 
out-patient settings, at home, or elsewhere;  
 
$ laboratory personnel handling clinical specimens; and 
 
$ health department staff who visit patients in or out of health care facilities 
while conducting outbreak assessment or control measures.  
$  
To protect workers when the presence or nature of a bioterrorism agent is not  
known, all workers should adhere to Standard Precautions (15) whenever they 
have contact with broken or moist skin, blood, or body fluids.  This includes the 
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use of disposable non-sterile gloves with hand-washing immediately after 
removal; and the use of a disposable gown or apron, and a face shield if any 
splashing is anticipated.  Protective gear is changed between patients to prevent 
the worker from transmitting infection from patient-to-patient.  Once identified, 
additional precautions based on the agent=s specific mode of transmission are 
applied, e.g., airborne, droplet or contact transmission. (15, 16) Supervisors 
should contact the local health department for additional instructions for worker 
vaccination, prophylactic antibiotic therapy, or other measures that may be 
appropriate for a given disease.  use of disposable non-sterile gloves with and 
washing immediately after remoaval; and athe use of a disposable gown or 
apron, and a face shield if any splashing is anticipated. 
 
First responders and others involved in out-of-hospital patient transport will be in 
closer proximity to the patient during transport.  They should comply with the 
infection control guidelines described above and can take the following additional 
precautions: 
 
$ Run the ambulance ventilation system on its highest setting using outside air 
circulation, which will maximize air changes in the vehicle (17); 
 
$ For diseases which are transmitted by respiratory transmission (droplet or 
aerosol), the patient should wear a surgical mask (15), disposable respirator 
(one without an exhalation valve) or, if needed for respiratory support, an 
oxygen mask that does not exhaust to ambient air; 
 
$ Responders transport patients with different diseases requiring different levels 
of worker respiratory protection.  It may simplify inventory selection to 
standardize on the more protective N95-class respirator. 
 
Potential occupational exposure involving recovery of a biological 
dissemination device: 
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A determined biological terrorist probably will try to avoid discovery while 
disseminating the infectious agent.  This will maximize the disease impact of the 
act.  Nonetheless, it is possible that a suspected dissemination device may be 
discovered before or after it releases its contents.  The worker risk involved in 
recovering this device and, if possible, mitigating its threat will determine the 
appropriate safety measures and personal protective strategies.  For incidents of 
relatively low potential hazard, such as envelopes claimed to be filled with 
Aanthrax spores,@ guidelines for containment and identification exist (18).  
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Other incidents may need to be approached with additional concern for exposure 
to the contents and for other hazards.  These other hazards include a possible 
"secondary device"explosive, timed to detonate during the response to the first 
event and injure responders (19).  On-scene commanders must evaluate the 
potential threat in consultation with local health and law enforcement resources 
and select appropriate strategies for worker protection, including personal 
protective equipment. 
 
Patient Decontamination 
 
When determining the need for decontamination in a biological setting, balance the 
risk that decontamination poses to the patient against the benefits it could provide.   
Unless gross contamination is evident, decontamination is unwarranted.  Instead, 
begin by removing clothes and placing them in a plastic bag pending agent 
identification.q  Taking a shower with soap and water should suffice to prevent illness 
(18).  Where gross contamination is found, only those areas of the skin that have 
been grossly contaminated should be decontaminated.  When the involved agent is 
unknown and could be either a chemical agent or biological agent, follow patient 
decontamination procedures for chemical agents. 
 
Mass Care 
 
Where a contagious biological agent has been dispersed, special care must be 
taken to prevent the mass care facility from becoming a focal point for further spread 
of the disease.  Effective medical screening of incoming people, rapid identification 
of ill people and their prompt removal from the mass care facility, and provision of 
antibiotics to others in the facility (if appropriate) will minimize the spread of any 
communicable disease. 
 
Environmental Issues 
 
Many biological agents live for only a short time outside the human body.  These 
agents are sensitive to environmental conditions, including heat and light, which 
makes biodecontamination unnecessary as a rule.  Sporeforming agents (e.g., 
anthrax) are more persistent; however, these biological agents occur naturally 
throughout much of the United States without causing outbreaks.  Where these  
 
q For most biological agents, simple laundering will be sufficient to remove any biological contamination. 
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agents occur naturally, background levels are rarely known; thus, sampling is of little 
value.  In general, environmental issues are not critical in a biological event. 
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Bioterrorism-Specific Planning Checklist 
 
Restriction of Movement 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
1. Have you identified state or local public health statutes, ordinances, or regulations 
that restrict movements of people who may have been exposed to a communicable 
disease? 
 
  
 
  
 
2. Have you determined the legal sufficiency of such statute, ordinances, or 
regulations? 
a. If no authority exists, have you developed plans for identifying and enacting 
necessary quarantine provisions?  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
3. Have you developed plans to implement existing provisions that restrict movements 
of people who may have been exposed to a communicable disease? 
a. Do these plans include provisions for credentialing people approved for 
movement within the quarantine area? 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
4. Have you developed a mechanism to review the effectiveness of these provisions 
and revise them in a timely manner to meet changing needs? 
 
  
 
  
 
5. Have you prepared a plan to utilize the federal regulations if state or local public 
health statutes, ordinances, or regulations that restrict movements of people are 
inadequate or absent? 
 
  
 
  
 
 
6. Have you developed a partnership with bordering states to enforce quarantine 
regulations if an outbreak of a communicable disease threatens to spread across 
state borders? 
 
  
 
  
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This section of the Planning Guidance discusses incidents involving chemical terrorism. 
 Hazardous chemical releases and site exposure are two important issues discussed as 
well as surveillance, laboratory diagnosis, medical management, and Consequence 
Management.   
 
During the 1995 sarin nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway system, roughly 3,800 
people sought treatment, nearly 1,000 were hospitalized for a few hours to a few days, 
and 12 died (20).  In 1984, the accidental release of 40 tons of methyl isocyanate from a 
pesticide factory in Bhopal, India, injured hundreds of thousands of people and killed 
about 4,000.r  Thus, respiratory inhalation of volatile chemicals can present a major 
danger of mass casualties.  
 
Many of the chemicals of concern for terrorism preparedness can be arranged under 
the following categories:  
 
$ Military agents  
$ Pulmonary (lung damaging) agents 
$ Irritants 
$ Vomiting agents  
$ Incapacitating agents 
 
Due to the number of chemicals of possible concern, it is impossible to provide a 
comprehensive list in a document of this size. 
 
The main differences between industrial chemical accidents and chemical terrorism may 
be intent and magnitude.  Efforts to enhance hazardous materials (HAZMAT) 
preparedness and response activities for chemical spills will better prepare communities 
to respond to terrorism events.  Likewise, chemical terrorism preparedness activities 
should collaterally benefit a community=s ability to effectively respond to HAZMAT 
emergencies (21). 
                                            
r Bhopal Disaster. Trade and Environment Database (TED) Projects, Case Study #233, available at URL: 
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/BHOPAL.HTM. 
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Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  1.1; 2.2] 
 
A chemical terrorism event is likely to be discovered in one of two ways: the local 
discovery of the environmental release or exposure incident or the diagnosis of the 
resultant patient cases.  Emergency responders may provide critical on-scene 
assessments and patient examinations that constitute an informal passive surveillance 
system.  These nationwide monitors could report potential events in a fashion timely 
enough to allow for rapid intervention (21).      
 
In a chemical event, surveillance is most useful for tracking exposed individuals for 
long-term physiologic difficulties, chronic illnesses, cancers, etc.  Effective post-event 
surveillance will require the establishment of a registry or database that includes the 
names and contact information for exposed people.  To be most effective, this registry 
should include at least the following information: 
 
$ Name 
$ Address and telephone number 
$ Age 
$ Where registrant was located during the events 
$ Where registrant can be contacted (if other than home) 
$ Symptoms (if any) and time of onset  
$ Medical treatment received (if information is available) 
 
Many presume that an explosion, used to disperse the chemical, will precipitate a 
chemical terrorism event.  Between the resulting fire and the rapid onset of symptoms, 
chemical incidents also are assumed to be overt, easily identifiable events.  In 
conducting surveillance activities, however, it is important not to discount immediately 
chemicals as the source of an unexplained syndrome.  Contaminating a water or food 
supply with a hazardous chemical could sicken many people, and prematurely 
eliminating chemicals as a potential causative agent could delay effective treatment. 
 
s Location at time of incident is important to separate exposed individuals from those suffering 
psychogenic illness and the Aworried well.@ 
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Laboratory Diagnosis 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  2.3.1.2; 2.3.2; 8.2.5] 
 
CDC does not conduct tests of environmental samples for chemicals.  The state must 
establish linkages to appropriate authorities at the local, state, and federal levels to 
ensure its ability to take and test environmental samples when required to characterize 
the site.  CDC does analyze blood, serum, and urine specimens for breakdown products 
to quantify human exposure to selected chemicals.   
 
As with the biological agents, CDC focuses its preparedness efforts on prioritized 
hazardous chemicals.  These priority agents include the following: 
 
$ Military nerve agents 
$ Sulfur and nitrogen mustards 
$ Lewisites 
$ Ricin 
$ Saxitoxin 
$ BZ 
$ Hydrogen cyanide 
$ Cyanogen chloride 
 
Whereas CDC is helping states develop their own biological laboratory capacities, CDC 
retains the capacity to conduct biomonitoring for chemicals mainly at the federal level.  
Moreover, CDC does not advocate that state laboratories test potential chemical 
terrorism samples before shipping them to CDC.   
 
Most state public health chemical laboratories do not possess necessary equipment or 
expertise to rule out the presence of a Level 4 biological agent that potentially could be 
present in a human sample collected from a suspected victim of a chemical attack.  
State laboratories also do not have the irradiators necessary to neutralize the hardiest 
of the biological agents, if they were present.  Thus, safety dictates that biological 
samples from chemically contaminated victims be sent directly to CDC for analysis. 
 
The initial samples sent to CDC for analysis from a known or suspected chemical event 
are automatically irradiated to neutralize any offending biological agent.  After the initial 
samples are irradiated, selected follow-up samples are tested by Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) and immunoassay to rule out the presence of a Level 4 biological 
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agent.  After samples are irradiated or cleared by PCR/immunoassay, then and only 
then, they are sent to CDC=s chemical laboratory for further testing.   
 
To cover the possibility that surge capacity is needed, CDC funded five partner state 
public health laboratories to buy the necessary equipment to conduct the sample 
analyses consistent with CDC=s safety protocols.  With the instruments, the states can 
identify exposures in the range of parts per trillion to parts per quintillion, depending 
upon what chemical is suspected. 
 
Specimen Collection 
 
It is important that the first 30 samples from the most contaminated (exposed) 
people be sent to CDC as rapidly as possible.  Expeditious shipment of the first 
samples will allow CDC laboratory personnel to help identify the causative agent and 
also will speed the determination of whether or not a second chemical agent is 
involved in the exposure.  After the first 30 samples are collected and shipped, 
CDC=s objective is that as many samples as possible be collected (either directly by 
CDC laboratory personnel who have been deployed to the site or by state or local 
medical personnel).   
 
Samples sent to CDC must not contain personal identifiers, but they must have 
unique identifiers.  Samples collected for CDC chemical analysis should conform to 
the following: 
 
$ For urine samples: at least 20 mL.  Use screw-capped plastic container. 
 
$ For serum samples: the yield from two 10-mL no-anticoagulant (U.S. color 
code red-top) tubes in plastic screw-capped vials.   Do not use SST tubes.  
 
$ For whole blood: one 5-mL or 7-mL NaOxalate/NaF anticoagulated tube (U.S. 
color code gray-top) or one 5-mL or 7-mL heparinized tube (U.S. color code 
green- top) unopened, plus an empty tube to check as a blank. 
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Shipping 
 
Secure specimens in cardboard vial storage boxes or Styrofoam-molded tube 
holders and enclose in large, zipper locking, plastic bags.  Place in a Styrofoam-
insulated shipper, and surround with absorbent material for cushioning.  Ship 
refrigerated using Acool-packs,@ not dry ice.  Enclose a shipping list with pertinent 
information about specimens and the name and telephone number of the 
appropriate contact person.  Each sample container top must be wrapped with 
waterproof, tamper-proof security tape (available from FBI/Police supply stores). 
 
All samples sent to CDC for chemical analysis should be shipped to this address: 
 
CDC DASH 
ATTN: Dr. Richard Meyer 
1600 Clifton Road 
Atlanta, GA 30333 
 
If you have questions about or problems with samples or sample shipment, contact 
the following CDC personnel: 
 
Charles Buxton 
Chemical Terrorism Rapid Response 
Team Leader 
Division of Laboratory Sciences 
(770) 488-4160 
 
Elaine Gunter, Chief 
NHANES Laboratory 
(770) 488-7938 
 
Division of Laboratory Sciences 
National Center for Environmental Health 
CDC 
(770) 488-7950 
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Medical Management 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment: 7.2] 
 
The treatment of exposed people by clinical syndrome rather than specific chemical is 
more useful for public health and emergency medical response planning.  Public health 
agencies and first responders may render the most aggressive, timely, and clinically 
relevant treatment possible by using treatment modalities based on syndromic 
categories (e.g., burns and trauma, respiratory failure, cardiovascular shock, and 
neurological toxicity).  Exhibit 3 contains a list of emergency medical conditions and 
needs associated with chemical exposures. 
 
CDC has developed Emergency Room Procedures in Chemical Hazard Emergencies:  
A Job Aid, which provides information on various chemicals pertaining to terrorism.  
This Job Aid is available on the CDC Web site at URL:  
www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/articles/initialtreat.htm.   
 
In addition, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) developed 
Managing Hazardous Materials Incidents, Volume III : Medical Management Guidelines 
for Acute Chemical Exposures.t  ATSDR developed these guidelines to aid emergency 
department physicians and other emergency health-care professionals who manage 
acute exposures resulting from chemical incidents.  The guidelines are intended to aid 
health-care professionals involved in emergency response to decontaminate patients 
effectively, protect themselves and others from contamination, communicate with other 
involved personnel, efficiently transport patients to a medical facility, and provide 
competent medical evaluation and treatment to exposed persons. 
                                            
t See also, Managing Hazardous Materials Incidents, Volume I - Emergency Medical Services: A Planning 
Guide for the Management of Contaminated Patients  and Managing Hazardous Materials Incidents, 
Volume II - Hospital Emergency Departments : A Planning Guide for the Management of Contaminated 
Patients.  All three volumes are available on the Web at URL: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov.   
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Exhibit 3 
Emergency Medical Conditions and Needs  
Associated With Chemical Exposures (21)   
 
 
Syndrome and Causative Agents 
 
Medical Therapeutic Needs 
 
 
Burns and Trauma 
Corrosives, vesicants, explosives, 
oxidants, incendiaries, radiologicals 
 
 
Intravenous fluid and supplies 
Pain medications 
Pulmonary products 
Splints and bandages 
 
 
 
Respiratory Failure 
Corrosives, military agents, 
explosives, oxidants, incendiaries, 
asphyxiants, irritants, 
pharmaceuticals, metals 
 
 
 
Pulmonary products 
Ventilators and supplies 
Antidotes (when available) 
Tranquilizing medications 
 
 
Cardiovascular Shock 
Military agents, pesticides 
asphyxiants, pharmaceuticals 
 
 
 
Intravenous fluid and supplies 
Cardiovascular products 
Antidotes (when available) 
 
 
Neurological Toxicity 
Military agents, pesticides, 
pharmaceuticals, radiologicals 
 
 
 
Antidotes (when available) 
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Consequence Management 
 
Response activities that should be consistent irrespective of the agent used are covered 
in Chapter 5.  The following is supplementary guidance that pertains specifically to a 
chemical incident. 
 
Worker Protection 
 
Worker Protection standards for chemicals are contained in 29 CFR 1910.120(q) 
and 29 CFR 1910.134.  When responders deal with a known or suspect chemically 
contaminated area, they should rely on personal protective equipment and 
respiratory protection standards described in the code to help ensure their safety.  
Health departments should work with responders to ensure that they are properly 
protected in the field. 
 
Recent events also have demonstrated the risk posed to emergency department 
personnel when treating chemically contaminated patients (22).  Thus, health 
department personnel should help ensure that their health-care counterparts are 
adequately prepared to treat chemically contaminated people and avoid becoming 
victims due to toxicity from secondary contamination.  Strategies include having 
appropriate resources to decontaminate patients, and utilizing appropriate personal 
protective equipment while decontaminating patients or treating patients who require 
care before decontamination (22).  
 
Patient Decontamination 
 
Liquid or aerosolized chemicals can pose a dermal threat and must be removed as 
rapidly as possible.  For these exposuresBvapor exposures do not require 
decontaminationBit is essential to remove the exposed person=s clothing and rapidly 
decontaminate by using copious amounts of soap and water.  Decontamination 
solution may be used, if available and appropriate.   
 
Mass Care 
 
Secondary contamination from chemicals may be possible but is unlikely when gross 
contamination is absent.  Effective screening of those arriving at the mass care 
facility to ensure that contaminated people are identified and effectively 
decontaminated before entering should be sufficient to prevent contamination of the 
facility or those temporarily residing in it.  Care must be taken to isolate bodily fluids 
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(including vomitus) to prevent secondary illness from off gassing after the ingestion 
of some chemicals. 
 
Mental Health 
 
The exposure to hazardous chemicals can lead to psychosocial responses different 
from, and in some instances greater than, other emergency situations.u  The inability 
to quantify exposure along with concerns about developing illnesses well into the 
future result in special feelings of vulnerability and loss of control.  The unique 
mental health concerns caused by a chemical event must be considered during the 
planning process. 
 
Environmental Decontamination 
 
The need to perform environmental decontamination for chemicals depends on the 
chemical involved.  Persistent chemicals can remain in the environment for long 
periods and must (if found in unsafe levels) be actively removed through 
decontamination.  Other chemicals are more volatile and will evaporate without 
outside intervention, thus eliminating the need for decontamination. 
 
 
u Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.  Report of the Expert Panel Workshop on the 
Psychological Responses to Hazardous Substances.  Available on the Web at URL: 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HEC/PRHS.  
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Appendix I 
BASIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING 
  
 
The Emergency Operations Planning Processv 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  5.1] 
 
Normally, a state=s emergency management agency is responsible for leading the 
overall effort to develop an all-hazard EOP.  This appendix offers suggestions to health 
departments for developing a health-related EOP, which should be incorporated into or 
annexed to the state=s all-hazard EOP.  
 
Basic emergency preparedness planning guidance is provided first because 
development of a health-related EOP will be the conceptual framework upon which the 
terrorism plan is built.  Exhibit 4 contains a flow chart, which lists questions to help 
health departments determine the best place to begin their planning efforts.   
 
Obviously, the plans can be developed in any order.  In fact, where the health 
department has no emergency response plan, it may be best to develop a terrorism 
response plan while undertaking the overall emergency planning effort.  Regardless of 
the order in which the plans are written, the health department must ensure that its 
terrorism preparedness and response initiatives are well integrated into the state=s 
overall emergency management and response systems. 
 
Principles 
 
Developing a plan for protecting the lives of a state=s citizens may seem a daunting 
task, but it need not be if the following principles are applied.  
                                            
v Much of the information contained in Appendix I has been adapted from FEMA=s State and Local Guide 
(SLG) 101:  Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, September 1996.  SLG 101 provides 
extensive guidance on developing general EOPs, as well as guidance on developing hazard-specific 
attachments or annexes to the EOP.  Information adapted from SLG 101 has been included here to help 
ensure that the health department=s emergency plans will be consistent with existing state emergency 
plans, easing incorporation and integration of the health response into the state=s all-hazards response 
capability.  To obtain a copy of SLG 101, contact FEMA=s publications warehouse at (800) 480-2520 or by 
mail at P.O. Box 2012, Jessup, MD 20794-2012.  An electronic copy of SLG 101 can be found at URL: 
http://www.fema.gov/pte/gaheop.htm. 
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Exhibit 4
Planning Flow Chart for Health Departments
Does state have a health-related 
Emergency Operations Plan?
Is health plan integrated 
into the all-hazard EOP?
Draft health EOP
Yes
No
Does state have a public health 
terrorism plan?
Is terrorism plan integrated into the
health plan?
Is terrorism plan integrated into
the all-hazard EOP?
Yes Integrate health plan into EOP
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes Draft health terrorism plan
Integrate terrorism plan into 
the health plan
No
No
Integrate terrorism plan into 
the all-hazard EOP
Successful integration of 
terrorism health plan into
the all-hazard EOP.
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Use Available Guidance and Training Materials 
 
The state emergency management community is a valuable resource for health 
department planners.  States typically publish their own emergency planning 
guides, conduct workshops and training courses, and assign their planners to 
work with other planners.  In addition,  FEMA supports state training efforts 
through its Emergency Management Institute and offers planning courses.  
FEMA also publishes a variety of planning-related documents.  Please refer to 
the Bibliography at the end of this Planning Guidance for a list of some of the 
reference materials that may be of use in health-related emergency planning.w 
 
In states with EOPs or other contingency plans, health departments can use 
these plans to begin organizing their own planning activities.  Existing plans 
direct planning coordinators to applicable authorities, indicate perceptions of 
localized or statewide risk, identify members of the state=s emergency response 
organizations, and identify mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions.  
Planning coordinators should review existing EOPs for questionable 
assumptions, inaccuracies, inconsistencies, omissions, and vagueness, 
especially in those areas under which health departments are assigned response 
duties. 
 
In addition, the planning coordinator should determine where the health response 
fits into the overall emergency preparedness and response efforts.  This 
assessment will minimize gaps and overlaps and lead to the desired seamless 
integration of public health into the overall emergency response effort.  Critiques 
of recent emergency operations and exercises in the state will help the planning 
coordinator develop a sense of what needs to be done. 
 
Build the Plan from Existing Public Health Expertise 
 
Traditionally, health departments have the legal responsibility to identify public 
health concerns and control disease outbreaks.  Although potentially expanded, 
these duties will form the foundation for a health department=s role in emergency 
preparedness and response. 
 
w Independent study planning courses are available on FEMA=s Web site (www.fema.gov) under 
APreparedness.@ 
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The expertise used daily by health departments will prove pivotal in making 
decisions about public health and safety during a natural or technologic (man-
made) emergency with public health ramifications.  Thus, it is important that the 
health department=s EOP build on these established capabilities. 
 
   Use the Team Approach to Planning 
 
The planning coordinator brings only one point of view to the plan.  If a coordinated 
emergency response depends on teamwork, planning the health-related portion of 
that effort should involve the state's emergency team.  The team approach to 
planning works best for these reasons: 
 
$ The EOP is more likely to be used and followed if the responsible 
organizations have a sense of ownership (i.e., their views were considered 
and incorporated). 
 
$ More knowledge and expertise are brought to the planning effort. 
 
$ Closer professional relationships between response and recovery 
organizations in the planning process should translate into better coordination 
and teamwork in emergencies. 
 
Choosing Team Members 
 
The planning team should be drawn from various groups that have a role or stake in 
emergency response. The list below is neither mandatory nor all-inclusive.  The 
important thing is that health departments ensure that members on the planning 
team represent a cross-section of organizations involved in a state's emergency 
preparedness and response efforts.  
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Potential Planning Team Members 
 
Health Director 
Governor=s representative 
Law enforcement agencies 
Local health departments 
Dispatch/911 
Public Information Officer 
Hospital staff 
Clinics and physicians 
Medical examiner/Coroner 
Department of Agriculture staff 
Pharmacist 
Veterinary services 
 
Emergency Management Director 
Mayors= representatives 
Fire/rescue/EMS 
MMRS personnel 
Hazardous materials teams 
Legal counsel 
Managed care representatives 
Mental health professionals 
Social service agency representatives 
Environmental Protection Agency staff 
Volunteer organization representatives 
Others 
 
Potential planning team members have many day-to-day responsibilities.  For the 
team to work together, members must be convinced that emergency planning has a 
higher priority than daily issues, and the people to make that argument are agency 
directors.  These key officials also determine which staff members will attend 
planning meetings and what priority the planning effort will be given, so it is 
important to secure their commitment early in the planning process.   
 
Planning Steps 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment: 1.2; 6.1; 6.2; 8.2.6; 8.2.7; 8.2.8) 
 
The following are basic steps for developing and continually refining an emergency 
response plan.  
 
1. Conduct Research:  Review the state laws, rules, regulations, executive orders, 
and other documents that may be considered enabling legislation as well as any 
applicable federal regulatory requirements.  Review guidance, existing state 
plans, and the plans of jurisdictions within the state.  Review Mutual Aid 
Agreements with neighboring states, military installations, and private sector 
organizations.  Finally, become familiar with the relevant federal plans that may 
be used as a basis for providing assistance. 
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11. Conduct a Hazard Analysis:x  Hazard analysis is the basis for effective and 
realistic emergency planning and helps a planning team decide what hazards 
merit special attention, what actions must be planned for, and what resources are 
likely to be needed.  Comprehensive hazard analysis merits its own document-
length discussion; however, basic considerations of process, methods, and 
sources include the following: 
 
$ Identify hazards to know what kinds of emergencies have occurred or 
could occur in your state.  Sources of hazard information would include 
CDC, FEMA, the National Response Center, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the state and local health departments, and poison 
centers.  For more localized hazards, information about the 10- and 50-
mile Emergency Planning Zones around nuclear power plants is available 
from state emergency management agencies, and hazardous materials 
information can be obtained from the Local Emergency Planning 
Committees.  
Many potential sources of hazard information exist for historical 
investigation.  Consult federal or state hazard analyses to see whether the 
historical occurrence of the hazard is tabulated by jurisdiction.  In addition, 
interview representatives from organizations on the planning team about 
their experience.  Check disaster records from the local chapter of the 
American Red Cross, police and fire departments, and other responder 
records. Research both statewide and local newspapers at the library and 
check with the state historical society and perhaps area universities (e.g., 
departments of history, medicine, sociology). 
 
$ Profile the hazards and their potential consequences.  The categories of 
information and the precision of the data depend on several factors.  One 
factor is the types of decisions the analysis is meant to support.  For 
example, to decide that one hazard poses more of a threat than another 
may require only a qualitative estimate (e.g., "high," "medium," "low"), 
whereas other issues may require a more quantitative assessment.  
Another factor is the availability of information and time.  It may be 
necessary to take a long-term view of hazard analysis with each version 
building on the preceding analysis as part of a "research agenda" for the 
public health response. 
 
x Because the Hazard Analysis may contain sensitive information, states should consider whether their 
open records statutes authorize withholding the Analysis from public disclosure. 
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$ Develop information on each of the hazards identified for the state and its 
jurisdictional subdivisions.  Of particular interest are the hazard's 
frequency of occurrence; magnitude and intensity; location, if the hazard is 
associated with a facility or landscape feature; spatial extent; duration; 
seasonal pattern; speed of onset; and availability of warning. 
 
$ Develop information on the potential consequences of the hazard.  
Several types of consequences can be investigated; however, for health 
planning purposes, the investigation can be limited mainly to the effects on 
people (e.g., total affected, number displaced, probable deaths, and 
illnesses or injuries).  The planning team can use both historical 
information and computer modeling to arrive at planning estimates.  
 
$ Compare and prioritize risks to determine which hazards merit special 
attention.  The planning team must consider the frequency of the hazard 
and the likely or potential severity of its consequences to develop a single 
indicator of the threat. This consideration allows comparison and priority 
setting.  Although a mathematical approach is possible, it is easier to 
manipulate qualitative ratings for different categories of information used 
in the ranking scheme.  
 
$ There is significant debate about the type of terrorism event on which 
planning and response communities should focus their preparedness 
efforts (e.g., low-probability events with potentially catastrophic results vs. 
higher probability, localized events).  CDC recommends focusing, at least 
initially, on more localized terrorism events because a state is more likely 
to encounter a localized event, and initially planning for a noncatastrophic 
event allows the response communities to coordinate efforts without 
overwhelming the response system.y 
 
$ On the basis of the hazard assessment, create credible scenarios and 
estimate resource requirements.  Because the plan should focus on non-
routine situations, only scenarios that result in consequences above a 
certain threshold need be considered.
 
y The Department of Health and Human Services suggested that cities plan to respond to a terrorist attack 
that potentially affects 10% of their population. Coping with this level of casualties would tax all aspects of 
an emergency response system and would require planning for the rapid augmentation of a community=s 
assets by state, regional, and federal assets without collapsing the local and state health-care systems.  
States may consider using this 10% figure as well, unless the resulting casualties will overwhelm the 
state=s ability to respond effectively. 
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$ Creating scenarios allows planners to group response actions according to 
the consequences of the event, irrespective of the initiating event.  For 
example, through scenarios, the consequences of a chemical terrorism 
event can be compared with those of a hazardous materials incident, or 
biological terrorism can be compared with a natural disease outbreak.  
Through this process, planners can group required response actions into 
categories based on the types and numbers of casualties.  Thus, the 
emergency response should not be hazard-specific unless the hazard 
response requires demonstrated special activities or capabilities.  In that 
case, you can place hazard-specific information in an annex or appendix 
to the overall EOP.z 
 
3. Determine the Resource Base:  Agency heads and other potential members of 
the planning team should know what kinds of resources they bring to emergency 
response and recovery.  Available resources should be listed and compared with 
the resources needed to respond effectively to the emergency.  Determining the 
resource base also should include a consideration of which facilities are vital to 
emergency operations and how they might be affected by identified hazards.  
Problems that cannot be mitigated should be addressed in the plan. 
 
Ultimately, identified shortages in resources mean that health departments may 
have to negotiate agreements with private suppliers or other jurisdictions. 
However, unless those agreements can be negotiated concurrently with the 
planning process, planning should proceed on the basis of existing resources. 
 
4. Note Special Facets of the Planning Environment:  The planning team should 
note geographic and topographic features that may affect operations, for 
example, dependence on a single main transportation artery into and out of a 
heavily populated portion of the state.  Planners also should identify special 
needs groups (non-English speakers, the aged, and the disabled) and where
 
z Chapter 6 of SLG 101 contains guidance regarding hazard-unique planning considerations.  SLG 101 
also contains eight attachments; each is dedicated to a specific hazard.  (Attachment G covers terrorism.) 
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 they are concentrated. Finally, the planning team should be alert to demographic 
and other trends in the state that affect planning assumptions. 
 
Plan Development  
 
Research leads to a written plan through steps similar to the following:  
 
$ Develop a rough draft of the basic plan and any necessary hazard-specific 
appendices for consideration by the planning team. 
 
$ Develop agendas and invitation lists for the first cycle of planning meetings; 
perhaps, deliver invitations in person and conduct preliminary interviews with 
key officials.  
 
$ Brief the state health officer; perhaps, invite him or her to the initial meeting 
as a keynote speaker. 
 
$ Conduct a presentation meeting, establish committees for developing parts of 
the plan, appoint committee chairs, and schedule a follow-up meeting.  
 
$ Work with committees on successive drafts.  
 
$ Prepare necessary graphics (e.g., maps and organizational charts). 
 
$ Produce a final draft and circulate the draft to the planning team for review 
and comment.  
 
$ Hold a meeting to incorporate final changes, discuss an implementation 
strategy and necessary distribution, and obtain informal commitments to 
provide information that could necessitate revision of the plan.  
 
$ Obtain concurrence from organizations with identified responsibilities for 
implementing the plan.  
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$ Present the plan to elected officials and obtain official concurrence.aa  
 
$ Print and distribute the plan.  
 
$ Maintain a record of the organizations and people who receive a copy of the 
plan. 
 
Ongoing Efforts 
 
Completing a response plan is not an end in itself.  Numerous activities should follow 
development of the plan to ensure that it remains current, useful, and appropriate.    
 
Validation and Evaluation 
 
Check the written plan for its conformity to applicable regulatory requirements 
and the standards of federal or state agencies, as appropriate.   Use tabletop, 
functional, and full-scale emergency management exercises to evaluate new or 
revised response plans.  Exercises offer the best way, short of emergencies, to 
determine whether the plan is understood, that it "works," and that it would 
actually be used in an emergency. 
 
Annual Assessment and Review 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  9.2] 
 
An assessment process can help a planning team identify, illuminate, and correct 
problems with the health plan because the process captures information from 
exercises, post-response critiques, self-evaluation, audits, and administrative 
reviews that may indicate where deficiencies exist.  The process involves at least 
annual reviews by the planning team to discuss problems and to consider and 
assign responsibility for remedies to correct noted deficiencies.  The assessment 
may involve revising planning assumptions and operational concepts, changing 
organizational tasks, or modifying organizational implementing instructions (e.g., 
SOPs).  It also may involve refresher training by an organization=s personnel on 
carrying out their responsibilities.
 
aa It is imperative that the planning team members keep all represented organizations, as well as elected 
officials, fully informed regarding planning progress throughout the process.  Continually updating key 
representatives of each responsible organization will minimize difficulties when final concurrence is 
sought.  
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Implementing Documents 
 
The assessment and review phase is an opportune time to ensure that each 
responsible organization has developed the SOPs necessary to accomplish 
assigned responsibilities.  The EOP does not anticipate every detail of the tasks 
it describes, but the details are important to implementation. 
 
Maintenance  
 
Plans should be flexible because problems emerge, situations change, gaps 
become apparent, and federal or state requirements are altered.  Thus, the EOP 
must be modified, as necessary, to remain useful and current.  
 
Training and Exercises 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  8.1; 8.2; 9.1] 
 
Developing the best possible emergency plan will not guarantee an effective 
response unless those responding know what is in the plan and act accordingly.  
Initial and follow-up training and exercises are necessary to ensure that the plan 
will be implemented as expected.   
 
Conducting effective training and exercises can identify where deficiencies exist 
in the plan.  In addition, review and evaluation of actual responses, large- or 
small-scale, help demonstrate whether the response to a major terrorism incident 
is consistent with the plan.  Demonstrated inconsistencies between the plan and 
a response will require revisions either to the plan or to future responses.  
Systematic plan review should occur even when deficiencies are not apparent.   
 
Filling Identified Resource Gaps 
 
Although the plan must be based on existing assets, planners most likely will 
identify supplemental needs through the planning process.  Some of these needs 
may be funded by federal agencies that have been granted congressional 
responsibility for providing assets to states and local communities to improve 
their ability to respond to terrorism.  In addition to CDC, some of the agencies 
providing terrorism preparedness grants include FEMA, HHS, OJP, and EPA. 
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Much of the assessment information required by these agencies for obtaining 
terrorism preparedness grants is similar.  Thus, rather than treating grants from 
these agencies separately, integrate all federal grant sources available to the 
state into the planning process and focus on the most critical identified gaps.  
Integrating all federal assets into the planning process will help prioritize 
identified needs; maximize the efficient use of available funds; ease integration of 
the new asset into the existing plan, if revision of the plan is not necessary; and 
promote revision of the plan, where necessary, to support integrating the new 
asset into the emergency response framework. 
 
Coordination With Other Agencies 
[DOJ/CDC Public Health Performance Assessment:  4.1] 
 
A variety of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations have information or 
expertise that will assist the health department in developing its terrorism response 
plan.  Moreover, many of these agencies will participate in the response effort.  Thus, 
coordination among these agencies will undoubtedly improve the overall preparedness 
and response efforts. 
 
State Emergency Response Commission/Local Emergency Planning 
Committees 
 
The previous section discussed the importance of reviewing available guidance and 
existing plans.  A good place to start that search is with your State Emergency 
Response Commission (SERC) and its Local Emergency Planning Committees 
(LEPCs).  The concept for these entities was established by Title III of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), also known as the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (23, 24).   
 
SARA Title III requires the governor of each state to establish a SERC.  Among 
other responsibilities, this commission establishes planning districts within the state 
and appoints LEPCs within those districts.  The LEPCs develop hazardous 
chemical-related emergency plans in coordination with a state=s chemical facilities, 
which are subject to ARight-to-Know@ requirements (i.e., the facilities possess 
chemicals listed on the EPA=s list of extremely hazardous substances in amounts 
that exceed identified threshold quantities).   
 
Activities undertaken by LEPCs should be fully integrated, along with the public 
health plan, into the community=s overall emergency response plan.  Moreover, 
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because the chemical plans were developed pursuant to guidance similar to that 
contained in this document, the LEPCs already may have completed some of the 
work required for developing the health EOP/terrorism response plan.bb 
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local Law Enforcement 
 
Throughout this document, the planner has been instructed to focus on the 
similarities between a response to a terrorism incident and the day-to-day or 
emergency activities of the public health system, instituting unique response actions 
only when necessary.  However, one area that clearly is unique in a terrorism event 
is the incident scene, which is also a crime scene. 
 
The FBI=s first priority is the same as the public health system=s:  protecting lives.  
Therefore, the actions and responsibilities of law enforcement and the public health 
system should not conflict.  However, law enforcement must secure the crime scene 
and preserve evidence.  Therefore, the entire emergency response community must 
understand the role of law enforcement agencies and coordinate response activities, 
such as search and rescue, so that the scene is not disturbed, thereby making 
evidence collection and protection more difficult. 
 
Joint Terrorism Task Force 
 
The first Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) was developed in New York City in 
1980.  Goals of the JTTF include increasing the effectiveness and productivity of 
scarce human and logistical resources, avoiding duplication of effort, and expanding 
cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies.   
 
Currently, JTTFs exist in these 30 U.S. cities:  Albuquerque, Atlanta; Boston; 
Charlotte; Chicago; Dallas; Denver; Detroit; El Paso; Houston; Indianapolis; Los 
Angeles; Miami; Minneapolis; New Orleans; New York City; Newark; Oklahoma City; 
Philadelphia; Phoenix; Pittsburgh; Portland, Oregon; Sacramento; Salt Lake City; 
San Antonio; San Diego; San Francisco; Seattle; Tampa; and Washington, DC.  
Task Forces also have been proposed for the following cities: Baltimore; Cleveland; 
Jacksonville; Las Vegas; Milwaukee; and San Juan.   Depending on its location, the 
 
bb Guidance for developing Local Emergency Planning Committee Plans is contained in U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency=s Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, Washington, DC: 
NRT, 1987;NRT-1.  
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JTTF may focus on domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or both. 
 
The JTTF comprises representatives of the FBI, other federal agencies (U.S. 
Marshals Service, the Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), 
and state and local law enforcement.  Members gather intelligence about domestic 
or international terrorist organizations and conduct investigations into planned 
terrorism acts; prevent such acts, if possible; or investigate the facts and collect 
evidence if a terrorism incident occurs within their jurisdiction.  In light of its 
intelligence gathering responsibilities, your state JTTF, if one exists, is a good 
starting point for developing a realistic threat assessment. 
 
The Plan 
 
Chapters 3 through 5 of this Planning Guidance provide checklists and guidance for 
developing technical provisions within the terrorism response plan.  This section and the 
checklist at the end of this appendix refer to generic or Aboilerplate@ plan provisions.  
Many of these provisions should be contained already in a state=s EOP.  If the plan 
includes these provisions, they should be reviewed to ensure that they include 
appropriate public health-related information.  If not included, the state should consider 
including them.   
 
Statement of Purpose  
 
Each plan should include a section outlining the purpose of the plan to aid in 
interpreting the rest of the document.  The Statement of Purpose can be succinct, 
expressing the purpose in broad terms.  Care should be taken, however, to ensure 
that there is no conflict between the Statement of Purpose and the body of the plan. 
  
 
Legal Authorities 
 
The plan should cite all appropriate federal, state, or local public health statutes, 
ordinances, and regulations authorizing the preparation of medical and health 
services disaster plans.  The plan should also cite the legal authorities for the 
following:  
 
$ Undertaking any actions necessary to protect public health and safety. 
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$ Enforcing quarantine of infected individuals, when necessary.  
 
$ Waiving the legal liability of, or providing immunity to, emergency workers.  
 
$ Providing disaster services by coroners, medical examiners, or mortuary 
workers. 
 
$ Providing for emergency procurement procedures and for access to, use of, 
and reimbursement for private-sector resources in an emergency. 
 
Planning Assumptions 
 
The plan should contain a section outlining any assumptions that are the basis for 
the plan.  It also may include limitations that could degrade health and medical 
operations.  Assumptions addressed might include the following:  
 
$ The state health plan applies primarily to large-scale emergency and disaster 
events that would cause casualties or fatalities sufficient to overwhelm local 
medical, health, and mortuary services capabilities, thus requiring maximum 
coordination and efficient use of these resources. 
 
$ Public and private health and medical resources located in the affected 
jurisdiction will be available for use during disaster situations.  Many of these 
resources, including human resources, could be affected by the event. 
 
$ It may be necessary to relocate hospital facilities under austere conditions to 
contingency field hospitals or to permanent or temporary buildings that can 
adequately protect patients and medical staff from the effects of the event. 
 
$ Volunteers will help perform some essential tasks; their efforts must be 
anticipated and coordinated. 
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Key Public Health Functions 
 
The plan should assign responsibility for all ten essential services as well as for 
other identified key emergency public health functions.  The descriptions of each key 
function should include a clear, concise list of all agencies that have primary and 
support responsibilities.  
 
Emergency Public Health Manager 
The plan should identify, by title, the specific person and alternates authorized to 
manage the public health emergency response.  It also should include the criteria by 
which the alternates will assume the duties of the person primarily responsible for 
managing the response.  The plan should include 24-hour contact numbers for each 
authorized emergency response manager. 
 
Threat Scenarios 
 
The plan should describe briefly the major scenarios that form the basis of the threat 
assessment and public health planning.  In the event that the scenarios predict 
similar casualties, these scenarios should be grouped into categories, and a uniform 
response strategy should be developed. 
 
Memoranda of Agreement 
  
This section of the plan should reference all existing interagency or interjurisdictional 
agreements concerning the public health emergency response.   It also should 
describe the mechanisms for activating the provisions of the agreements and briefly 
explain the types of events that will trigger activation of any agreements.  Finally, if 
limitations on activation exist, identify these limitations as well.cc 
 
cc For example, a typical activation limitation authorizes a party to a Mutual Aid Agreement to abstain from 
providing agreed upon assets in an emergency, if providing the assets would jeopardize the party=s ability 
to protect its own community.  
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Abbreviations and Definitions 
 
Keep abbreviations to a minimum.  When used, they should be explained in the 
body of the plan or in an appendix.  The document also should define key or 
unfamiliar terms.  A definition section especially is important when parties with 
responsibility under the plan use terms that have different meanings in their 
respective day-to-day operations. 
 
Plan Distribution, Record-of-Receipt, and Updates 
 
The plan should include procedures for maintaining a record of distribution that 
shows the name and address of each recipient agency, the number of copies 
provided, and the date of transmittal.  The plan also can include a record-of-receipt 
form that can be signed and returned by each party receiving a copy of the plan. 
 
Maintaining an accurate record of receipt is imperative to ensuring that each version 
of the plan in circulation is the most recent.  Thus, the distribution tracking system 
should be tied to a system for distributing changes to the plan.   This latter system 
also can include record-of-receipt forms that are mailed with the change pages and 
returned to the agency distributing the revisions once the plan is revised. 
 
The plan also should include a page for recording all changes made to the plan over 
time.  This record should include a place for the appropriate signatories to confirm 
adoption of the changes.    
 
The plan should require routine annual review and procedures for determining when 
the plan should be reviewed more frequently as a result of changing circumstances. 
 This section of the plan also should describe the methods that will be used to 
update the plan and detail the criteria that will be used to change the plan.   
 
Signature Block 
 
The plan should include a section for approval signatures.  Determine whether any 
signing jurisdiction requires a notary seal or other attestation to validate the 
document. 
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Basic Emergency Preparedness Planning Checklist 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
1. Have you outlined the purpose of the plan?  
 
  
 
   
2. Have you cited appropriate federal, state, and local public health authorizing 
legislation, ordinances, and regulations? 
 
  
 
  
 
3. Have you outlined any assumptions on which the plan is based? 
 
  
 
   
4. Have you assigned responsibility for the ten essential services and other identified 
key emergency public health functions? 
 
  
 
  
 
5. Have you identified specific individuals and alternates authorized to direct the public 
health emergency response? 
 
  
 
  
 
6. Have you referenced the major scenarios or scenario categories? 
 
    
7. Have you referenced existing interagency or inter-jurisdictional agreements? 
 
  
 
   
8. Have you explained all abbreviations and defined key or unfamiliar terms? 
 
  
 
   
9. Have you included procedures for maintaining a record of plan distribution and a 
record-of-receipt form? 
 
  
 
  
 
10. Have you provided update guidance and a record-of-change page? 
 
  
 
   
11. Have you included a signature block?  
 
  
 
  
12.  Does the plan contain the following protocols? 
 
  
 
  
 
  
a. Protocols for convening police, fire, EMS, local hospitals, public health officials, 
members of the local emergency planning committee, EOCs, and other relevant 
parties on a periodic basis to review the content of the plan. 
 
  
 
  
b. Protocol for designating, by title, the public health personnel (and alternates) 
responsible for staffing the centralized EOC when activated 
 
  
 
  
c. Protocol for coordinating public health responsibilities with law enforcement 
responsibilities. 
 
  
 
  
d. Protocols for notifying interagency, media, and public of an emergency. 
 
  
 
  
e. Protocol for informing the public of population prevention measures which 
include: hazards to expect, precautions to take, requirements for evacuation or 
shelter-in-place. 
 
  
 
  
f. Protocol for credibility threat assessment process (in coordination with the FBI). 
 
  
 
_  
g. Protocol for mutual aid agreements and interagency coordination. 
 
  
 
  
h. Protocol for implementing an emergency epidemiologic investigation for human 
and animal exposures. 
 
  
 
  
i. Protocol for implementing evacuation and mass casualty transportation. 
 
  
 
  
j. Protocol for initiating the public health response when a device is found that 
may contain a biological or chemical agent. 
 
  
 
  
k. Protocol for methods for collecting, handling, decontaminating, transporting, 
preserving, and storing biological and chemical evidence, including maintaining 
the chain of custody, referral to state public health laboratory, and referral to 
federal laboratory. 
 
  
 
  
k. Protocol for interviewing potentially contaminated or infectious victims. 
 
  
 
  
m. Protocol for critical incident stress counseling for victims or response personnel, 
including public health and medical professionals. 
 
  
 
  
 
n. Protocol for protecting care-providers and victims from secondary exposures. 
 
  
 
     
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Basic Emergency Preparedness Planning Checklist 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
o. Protocol for decontaminating mass casualties (pre-hospital) and patients upon 
their arrival at the treatment facility. 
    
  
p. Protocol for ensuring that contamination of treatment facilities does not occur 
when patients are evaluated or treated.  
 
  
 
  
 
q. Protocol for instituting mass isolation within a health facility. 
 
  
 
   
r. Protocol for incorporating state and federal assets into the local response 
efforts. 
 
  
 
  
 
s. Protocols for requesting state or federal (civilian or military) pharmaceutical 
stockpiles. 
 
  
 
  
 
t. Protocol for the receipt, security, and distribution of stockpile assets. 
 
  
 
   
u. Protocol for instituting mass vaccinations or medication distribution to first 
responders and to medical/health care providers. 
 
  
 
  
 
v. Protocol for responding to mass mortuary needs. 
 
  
 
   
w. Protocol for identifying and obtaining mental health resources that will treat both 
responders and victims. 
 
  
 
  
 
x. Protocol for baseline and post-incident medical screening for all personnel 
involved. 
 
  
 
  
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Appendix II 
NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL STOCKPILE PROGRAM  
 
A release of selected biological or chemical agents targeting the U.S. civilian population 
will require rapid access to large quantities of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies.  
Such quantities may not be readily available unless special stockpiles are created.  No 
one can anticipate exactly where a terrorist will strike, and few state or local 
governments have the resources to create sufficient stockpiles on their own.  Therefore, 
a national stockpile was created as a resource for all. 
 
The NPS is a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-
support medications, IV administration and airway maintenance supplies, and 
medical/surgical items. The NPS Program is designed to supplement and re-supply 
state and local public health agencies in the event of a biological or chemical terrorism 
incident anywhere, at anytime within the United States or its territories. 
 
The decision to deploy NPS assets may be based on evidence showing the overt 
release of an agent or credible intelligence information.  However, it is more likely that 
subtle indicators, such as unusual morbidity and mortality identified through the U.S. 
disease outbreak surveillance and epidemiology network, will alert health officials to the 
possibility (and confirmation) of a biological or chemical terrorism incident.  To receive 
NPS assets, the affected state can request the deployment of the NPS directly from the 
Director of CDC.  Once requested, the Director of CDC has the authority, in consultation 
with the Surgeon General, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to deploy the NPS.  The NPS is segregated into several packages.  First, 
there are immediate response APush Packages,@ which are caches of 
pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies designed to address a variety of 
biological or chemical agents.  These Push Packages are positioned in secure regional 
warehouses ready for delivery anywhere in the continental United States within 12 
hours after a federal decision to deploy.  CDC also plans to reach sites beyond the 
continental U.S. in 12 hours, although delivery may take longer in some circumstances. 
   
If the incident requires additional pharmaceuticals or medical supplies, follow-up Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI) supplies will be shipped to arrive within 24 to 36-hours.  The  
follow-on VMI packages can be tailored to provide pharmaceuticals, supplies, and/or 
products specific to the suspected or confirmed agent or combination of agents.   
 
Due to the delays between the onset of the event and receipt of NPS assets, the NPS is 
not a first response tool.  However, state and local first responders and health officials 
can use the NPS to bolster their response to a biological or chemical terrorism 
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attack, thereby increasing their capacity to more rapidly mitigate the results of this type 
of terrorism.   
 
Determining and Maintaining NPS Assets 
 
CDC partners with intelligence experts who evaluate chemical and biological terrorism 
to ensure that the composition of the NPS reflects current biological and chemical 
threats.  CDC and its federal partners use this information to prioritize the potential 
biological and chemical agents and to determine NPS contents.  CDC ensures that all 
medical materiel used in normal hospital operations will be rotated and kept within 
potency shelf life limits.  
 
Transfer of NPS Assets to State and/or Local Authorities 
 
The Push Packages are configured to allow their immediate loading onto either trucks 
or commercial cargo aircraft for the most rapid transportation possible.  CDC will   
coordinate with state and local officials while the NPS is en route, so that stockpile 
assets can be efficiently received and distributed upon arrival at the site. 
 
CDC will transfer responsibility for NPS materiel to the appropriate state or local 
authorities once it arrives at the airfield.  State and local authorities must be prepared to 
repackage and label bulk medicines and other NPS materiel according to established 
SOPs.  CDC=s technical advisors will accompany the NPS to assist and advise state or 
local officials in putting the NPS assets to prompt, effective use. 
 
Training and Education 
 
The NPS Program is charged with leading a nationwide preparedness training and 
education program for state and local health-care providers, first responders, and state 
and local governments.  This training not only explains the NPS mission and operations 
but it alerts state and local emergency response officials to the important issues they 
must plan for to receive, secure, and distribute NPS assets.  To conduct this outreach 
and training, NPS Program staff is working currently with HHS agencies, Regional 
Emergency Response Coordinators at all ten U.S. Public Health Service regional 
offices, as well as state departments of health, state emergency management agencies, 
the Metropolitan Medical Response System, regional offices of the FBI and other 
agencies within the Department of Justice, FEMA, the Department of Veterans= Affairs, 
and the Department of Defense.  
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NPS Program staff has established guidance for developing stockpile-related SOPs.   
This guidance includes information on how states should identify procedures for 
accepting, securing, repackaging, and distributing NPS assets.  The NPS guidance was 
not included in this Planning Guidance due to the sensitive nature of some of the 
information in that document.  However, state and local public health planners may 
obtain a copy by contacting the NPS Program as follows: 
 
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program 
4770 Buford Highway NE  
Mailstop F-23 
Atlanta, GA 30341-3724 
(770) 488-7516 
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